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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2013. 12. 24. 선고 2013나14049 판결

[점포명도등][미간행]

Plaintiff and appellant

As shown in the separate list of the plaintiffs (Attorney Kim-Hy, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant

boom Poom Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Changyang, Attorneys Kim Jong-jin, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

December 3, 2013

The first instance judgment

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gadan215929 Decided January 23, 2013

Text

1. The judgment of the first instance, including the claim of the plaintiff 9 added in the trial, shall be modified as follows:

A. The Defendant: (a) is a Co., Ltd., Ltd., and is the International Address ( Address 2 omitted)

(1) At the same time, Plaintiff 1 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 1, the real estate listed in paragraph (1) of the attached Table of Real Estate;

(2) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 2, real estate stated in paragraph (2) of the same list to Plaintiff 2;

(3) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 3, real estate stated in paragraph (3) of the same list to Plaintiff 3;

(4) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 4, real estate stated in paragraph (4) of the same list to Plaintiff 4;

(5) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 5, real estate stated in Paragraph (5) of the same list to Plaintiff 5;

(6) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 6, real estate stated in paragraph (6) of the same list to Plaintiff 6;

(7) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 7, real estate described in paragraph (7) of the same list to Plaintiff 7;

(8) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 8, real estate stated in Paragraph 8 of the same Schedule to Plaintiff 8;

(9) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 9, real estate stated in paragraph (9) of the same list to Plaintiff 9;

(10) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 10, real estate described in paragraph 10 of the same list to Plaintiff 10;

(11) At the same time with payment of KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 11, the real estate described in Paragraph (11) of the same Table to Plaintiff 11;

(12) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 12, the real estate described in paragraph (12) of the same list to Plaintiff 12;

(13) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 13, real estate described in paragraph (13) of the same list to Plaintiff 13;

(14) At the same time, Plaintiff 14 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 14, real estate described in paragraph 14 of the same list;

(15) At the same time, Plaintiff 15 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 15, real estate described in paragraph 15 of the same list,

(16) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 16, real estate listed in paragraph 16 of the same list to Plaintiff 16;

(17) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 17, real estate set forth in paragraph 17 of the same list to Plaintiff 17;

(18) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 18, the real estate described in Paragraph (18) of the same Schedule to Plaintiff 18;

(19) At the same time receiving 8,000,000 won from Plaintiff 19, each real estate listed in paragraph (19) of the same Schedule to Plaintiff 19;

(20) At the same time receiving KRW 4,000,000 from Plaintiff 20, real estate stated in paragraph 20 of the same list to Plaintiff 20;

(21) At the same time, Plaintiff 21 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 21, real estate stated in Paragraph 21 of the same list;

(22) At the same time receiving 12,000,000 won from Plaintiff 22, each of the real estate listed in Paragraph 22 of the same Table to Plaintiff 22;

(23) At the same time receiving 8,000,000 won from Plaintiff 23, each of the real estate listed in paragraph (23) of the same list to Plaintiff 23;

(24) At the same time, Plaintiff 24 received KRW 8,00,000 from Plaintiff 24, each of the real estate listed in paragraph 24 of the same list,

(25) At the same time, Plaintiff 25 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 25, real estate stated in paragraph 25 of the same list;

(26) At the same time receiving 4,000,000 won from Plaintiff 26, real estate stated in paragraph 26 of the same list to Plaintiff 26;

(27) At the same time, Plaintiff 27 received KRW 4,00,000 from Plaintiff 27, real estate stated in Paragraph 27 of the same list.

India, respectively.

B. The defendant against the plaintiff 9

(1) 19,010,680 won and 6% interest thereon per annum from July 13, 2013 to December 24, 2013, and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment;

(2) Money calculated at the rate of KRW 8,626,100 per annum from July 1, 2013 to the date on which delivery of the real estate listed in paragraph (9) of the attached Table 9 is completed.

sub-payment.

C. All remaining claims of the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. Of the total litigation costs, the portion arising between the plaintiff 9 and the defendant is ten minutes, and the remaining portion is four minutes, while the part arising between the plaintiff 9 and the defendant is four minutes, and the remaining part is assessed against the plaintiffs, and the remaining part is assessed against the defendant.

3. The above paragraphs (1) and (2) may be provisionally executed.

Purport of claim and appeal

The decision of the first instance court is revoked. The defendant shall deliver each of the plaintiffs' real estate corresponding to the plaintiffs according to the annexed real estate list Nos. 33,917,622 to the plaintiffs, and the amount calculated by the ratio of 20% per annum from the day following the delivery of the copy of the application for amendment of the purport of the claim of this case to the day of complete payment. The defendant shall pay the amount calculated by the ratio of 8,626,100 won per annum from July 1, 2013 to the day of complete delivery of the real estate stated in the annexed real estate list No. 9 (the plaintiff 9 added the above money to the court below).

Reasons

1. Basic facts

(a) Conclusion of a lease agreement;

(1) On June 30, 2006, the Meomy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Meomy”) concluded a lease agreement with the Defendant (hereinafter “the lease agreement in this case”) to lease to the Defendant the total of 565 units (excluding the 1 omitted) sales facilities of non-Seoul (hereinafter “the entire commercial building in this case”) and non-Seoul (hereinafter “the entire commercial building in this case”) and non-Seoul (hereinafter “the lease agreement in this case”). < Amended by Act No. 7870, Jun. 30, 2006; Act No. 7871, Sep. 2, 2011; Act No. 7855, Feb. 31, 2006; Act No. 787, Feb. 22, 2011>

(2) Of the instant lease agreement agreement (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”), the contents pertaining to the instant case are as follows, and a notary public certified the instant lease agreement on July 18, 2006 by a law firm Chang-chuld:

1. Where the Defendant sells all or part of the object to the operator of the business of this case and the status of the purchaser of this contract is succeeded to the number of buildings under this contract, and the Defendant (the lessee) agrees to the contract with the first 6th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th th.

(b) Succession to a lease contract and acquisition of sectional ownership;

After September 2006, the plaintiffs succeeded to the lessor's status against the defendant by completing the registration of ownership transfer on each of the plaintiffs' real estate (hereinafter "each of the pertinent commercial buildings of this case") in accordance with the sequences in the annexed real estate list, each of which constitutes the whole commercial buildings of this case, from theme, and around August 2006, plaintiffs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 26, 27 agreed to succeed to the status of the lessor against the defendant among the plaintiffs.

(c) Notification of the renewal and termination of the lease;

(1) As the term of lease under the instant lease contract expires (2 years from September 1, 2006, which is the starting date of the Defendant’s business), the instant lease contract was automatically extended for two years under Article 18(2) of the instant lease contract. The instant lease contract was renewed on September 1, 2010, which has expired two years after the term of lease.

(2) On July 24, 2012, between June and January 24, 2012, which was the expiration date of the instant lease agreement, the Plaintiffs sent to the Defendant each written notice of the expiration date of the instant lease agreement and the intent to refuse the renewal thereof pursuant to Article 18(2) of the instant lease agreement, and each of the said written statements reached the Defendant around that time.

(d) Transfer of claims for return of lease deposit;

Around June 2007, the Defendant transferred the claim for the refund of the lease deposit against the Plaintiffs to the Hybre International Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Sbreman International”), and notified the Plaintiffs of the assignment of the said claim. The notification of the assignment of the claim reached the Plaintiffs around that time.

E. A conclusive profit security agreement between the plaintiff 9 and the defendant

On September 21, 2006, the Defendant, notwithstanding Article 6 of the instant lease agreement with the Plaintiff 9, who succeeded to the status of the lessor of theme, guaranteed the Plaintiff 9’s annual profit of 123,230,000 won of the parcelling-out price of the commercial building owned by the Plaintiff 9 during the term of lease: Provided, That if the details of the conclusive profit security are leaked to a third party, the special agreement that guarantees the fixed profit security is null and void and the monthly rent under the lease succession agreement (hereinafter “the special agreement that guarantees the fixed profit of this case”).

F. Current status of operation of the entire commercial building of this case

The whole commercial building of this case is a commercial building to which Article 1-2 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings (hereinafter "the Aggregate Buildings Act") applies, and the defendant, a lessee, registered the opening of a superstore under the Distribution Industry Development Act as to the whole commercial building of this case composed of 565 divided stores including each of the relevant commercial buildings on August 18, 2006. The whole commercial building of this case is operated as a large shopping mall with the trade name of "boom boom."

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 4, 9, 22, Eul evidence 10 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for delivery of building

A. The parties' assertion

(1) The plaintiffs' assertion

Unlike the cancellation or termination of a contract under the instant lease agreement, it is not necessary to decide and notify the majority of the buyers of the entire commercial buildings of this case on July 24, 2012, and the Plaintiffs notified the Defendant of the expiration of the contract term under the instant lease agreement pursuant to Article 18(2) of the instant lease agreement. As such, the instant lease agreement was terminated on August 31, 2012. Accordingly, the Defendant, a lessee, is obligated to deliver each of the instant commercial buildings to the Plaintiffs, who are the lessor.

(2) The defendant's assertion

The lease contract of this case was concluded at the beginning to operate the whole commercial building of this case as a single large shopping mall. The lessor, including the plaintiffs, divided the whole commercial building of this case into 565 units of sales facilities. The buyers, including the plaintiffs, invest a certain amount in the commercial building of this case on the premise that the whole commercial building of this case will be operated as a large shopping mall, and purchase each unit for the purpose of acquiring lease profit by unit. The prices of sales facilities of this case are now combined several units and operated as a single brand store. Further, the rent of this case is paid according to the total sales amount of the whole commercial building of this case and its substantial nature means investment profits of each of the commercial buildings of this case, and if the plaintiffs are able to terminate the lease contract of this case by notifying the expiration of the lease contract of this case against the intention of other buyers, it can be interpreted that the contract of this case can be terminated by the agreement of this case with the majority of the whole buyers of this case, and it can be interpreted that the contract of this case can be terminated by the agreement of this case.

B. Determination

(1) Relevant legal principles

Where the content of a contract between the parties to the contract is written in writing as a disposal document and the objective meaning of the text is clear, barring any special circumstance, the existence and content of the expression shall be recognized in accordance with the language and text. However, if the objective meaning of the language and text is not clearly revealed, the content of the contract shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules, social common common sense and transaction norms so that it can be in line with the ideology of social justice and equity by comprehensively considering the contents of the text and the motive and background leading up to the execution of the contract, the purpose and genuine intent to be achieved by the parties to the contract, and transaction practices, etc. In particular, if the content of the contract claimed by one party imposes a serious liability on the other party, the content of the language and text shall be interpreted more strictly (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da20762, Apr. 26,

(2) Determination

(A) Articles 4 and 18(2) of the instant lease agreement provides that the term of lease under the instant lease agreement shall be two years from September 1, 2006, which is the Defendant’s business commencement date, and the two-year term of lease shall be automatically extended unless the parties to the instant lease notify the termination date between June and January before the expiration date of the said term of lease, and the fact that the Plaintiffs notified the Defendant of the expiration date of the instant lease agreement on July 24, 2012, which is six months from August 31, 2012, which is the expiration date of the instant lease agreement.

(B) In full view of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the notification of the expiration of the instant lease agreement that the Plaintiffs made to the Defendant is legitimate and that the notification of the expiration of the lease agreement of this case is unnecessary upon the notification of the expiration of the lease agreement of this case, and that the notification of the termination of the lease of this case does not need to be made by a majority of the buyers of the entire commercial building of this case, and that the notification of the termination of the lease of this case is insufficient for the establishment of the foregoing recognition and there is no other counter-proof. Therefore, the notification of the expiration of the lease of this case made by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant is legitimate. Since the lease of this case between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant expired on August 31, 2012 by notification of the expiration of the lease term as above by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant, the lessee, is obligated to deliver each of the instant commercial buildings to the Plaintiffs, who are the lessees.

① Under the instant lease agreement, the requirements and procedures for the cancellation of the contract, the conditions and procedures of the cancellation of the contract, and the notification due to the expiration of the contract are stipulated as separate provisions. The subject of the cancellation of the contract or the termination of the contract is classified as 'me or buyer', and the subject of the notification of the expiration of the contract is 'party to this contract'. In particular, in order for the plaintiffs to cancel and terminate the contract of this case, due to the reasons common to the majority of the sectional owners of the entire commercial building of this case including the plaintiffs, the above sectional owners notified the defendant of the cancellation and termination of the contract (Articles 15, 18, 18, 1, 3 of the instant lease agreement). On the contrary, in order to terminate the contract of this case as the expiration of the contract of this case, the two-year lease term should be notified to the defendant from June 1, 200 to June 1, 200 (Article 18 (2) of this case). The above provisions of the lease agreement of this case, the disposal document, and the contents of the contract of this case, can be interpreted more objectively.

② The entire shopping mall of this case is operated as a large shopping mall, and each of the relevant shopping mall owned by the plaintiffs is used as a single store. However, according to the so-called principle of freedom of contract, which is a freedom not forced by law or by the State, the owner of each of the relevant shopping mall of this case and the lessor shall be free to choose from the renewal of the contract or the restraint of the contract when the term of the lease stipulated in the lease contract of this case expires. However, the restriction on the rights of the above plaintiffs is limited to obtaining the consent of a majority of all the sectional owners of the entire shopping mall of this case but can be seen as being harmful to the restraint of the lease of this case due to the expiration of the term of the lease, there must be explicit provisions on the lease of this case.

③ In particular, rather than directly preparing the instant lease agreement with the Defendant, it is reasonable to presume that the buyers of the entire commercial building of this case, including the Plaintiffs who succeeded to the status of the lessor from megaless, have rights and obligations as stipulated in the instant lease agreement, and conclude an agreement to take over the instant lease agreement with the Defendant. Since the Defendant and megalesms, at the time of the conclusion of the instant lease agreement, planned that the status of the lessors will be succeeded to a large number of buyers, the Defendant, who directly participated in the process of preparing the instant lease agreement, need to specify the purpose of restricting rights and the requirements and procedures for exercising rights on the instant lease agreement, in order to limit the lessors’ rights that can assert the termination of the instant lease agreement due to the expiration of the period of validity.

④ Article 651(1) of the Civil Act provides, “The duration of the lease except in the case of land lease the object of which is to own a building or any other structure made of stone, stone, brick, or any other solid building or structure similar thereto, or land lease the object of which is to own salt shall not exceed 20 years. If the period agreed upon by the parties exceeds 20 years, it shall be shortened to 20 years.” This provision provides, “If the period agreed upon by the parties exceeds 20 years, it shall be reduced to 20 years.” This provision takes into account the fact that if the lessee is entrusted with the use of the leased object for a long time, the management of the leased object may be neglected and the improvement of the leased object may cause socioeconomic loss due to its failure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da19961, Aug. 22, 2003). Even if the whole shopping mall operated as a large shopping mall, compelling the Plaintiffs to maintain the lease agreement against the individual lessor’s will, as well as social and economic loss.

⑤ Under the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings, a sectional owner of an aggregate building may freely use, benefit from, and dispose of his section of exclusive ownership unless it is against common interests of the sectional owners with respect to activities harmful to the preservation of the aggregate building (Article 211 of the Civil Act, Article 5(1) of the Aggregate Buildings Act): Provided, That if there is an act contrary to common interests of the sectional owners, relief measures may be taken against such an act. First, when the degree of such a violation is minor, a sectional owner who committed such a violation may request that the owner take measures necessary to prevent such an act be suspended, remove the result of such act, or take measures to prevent the act (Article 43(1) of the Aggregate Buildings Act). If, due to such a violation, it is extremely difficult to secure the use of the section of exclusive ownership or maintain the community life of the sectional owners due to such an act, the request for removal of the obstacle, or for the maintenance of the community life of the above sectional owners, the sale of the building in question, which is one of the above sectional owners, can only be acknowledged that the other sectional owners’ right of exclusive ownership.

(6) Article 1-2 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings provides that a single commercial building may be the object of ownership of a sectioned store which satisfies certain requirements. Barring special circumstances, the number, type, structure, location, and size of a sectioned store is specified by the registration of building ledger and registration based thereon (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da105, May 24, 2012, 201, etc.). Even if the boundary wall installed between neighboring sections loses independence as a sectioned building due to removal for certain reasons, the location, size, etc. of each sectioned building may be specified, and if it is easy to restore it as a sectioned building, it cannot be readily concluded that the substance as a sectioned building is lost, and even if it is not possible to restore it, each of the registration of the sectioned building shall be interpreted as valid as a registration indicating the substance as a sectioned building (see Supreme Court Order 2012Da105, May 24, 2012).

(3) As to the defendant's simultaneous performance defense

In regard to this, the Defendant paid 4,00,000 won to the Plaintiffs for each of the instant commercial buildings, and the Defendant transferred the claim for the refund of the lease deposit to the third person in the third person. However, even if the lessee lost the claim for the refund of the lease deposit due to the assignment of claims, the simultaneous performance relationship between the obligation to return the object and the obligation to return the lease deposit still exists. Thus, the obligee, the assignee of the claim, cannot deliver each of the instant commercial buildings to the Plaintiffs before the repayment of the lease deposit from the Plaintiffs.

On the other hand, when a lease contract is terminated, the lessor's obligation to return the deposit and the lessee's obligation to return the object are in the simultaneous performance relationship, and even if the lessee's obligation to return the deposit is entirely performed, the same obligation is maintained as it is, so concurrent performance relationship shall also be interpreted as it remains as it is (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2476, Apr. 12, 198). As seen earlier, the Defendant paid to the Plaintiffs the lease deposit amount of KRW 4,00,000 for each of the instant commercial buildings. Although the Defendant transferred the above obligation to return the deposit, even if the Plaintiffs were to have actually performed the obligation to return each of the instant commercial buildings, or provided the obligation to return each of the instant commercial buildings, the Defendant did not deliver each of the instant commercial buildings, so long as the lessee or the lessee loses his right to defense due to reasons such as delayed performance of the obligation to return the leased object, the Defendant's refusal to return the deposit cannot be asserted by the Plaintiffs.

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, the defendant is obliged to deliver each of the pertinent shopping districts of this case to the plaintiff 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 4,00,000, 19, 23, 24, 8,00,000, and 2212,00,000,000 won for each of the pertinent shopping districts of this case by the plaintiffs.

3. Determination as to Plaintiff 9’s monetary claim

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

The facts of the instant conclusive profit security agreement concluded between the Defendant and the Plaintiff 9 are as seen earlier. If the purport of the entire pleadings is comprehensively reflected in the statement No. 23-1 and No. 2 of the evidence No. 23, the Defendant did not pay KRW 33,917,622, which is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent based on the total sales from September 2006 to June 2013. Thus, the Defendant is not obligated to pay the Plaintiff 9 the amount equivalent to the annual rent or unjust enrichment of KRW 33,917,622, which is equivalent to the monthly rent or unjust enrichment of the Plaintiff 9, and the amount equivalent to the annual rent of KRW 9,917,622, which is equivalent to the above monthly rent of the Plaintiff 9, and the Defendant is also obligated to pay the amount equivalent to the annual rent of KRW 8,626,100 from July 1, 2013 to June 1, 2019.

B. Judgment on the defendant's argument

(1) The assertion that the instant conclusive profit security agreement is valid only during the initial lease agreement period.

The Defendant is obligated to pay Plaintiff 9 the rent calculated at 7% per annum for the contract term stipulated in the instant lease agreement as the implementation of the instant conclusive profit security agreement, and there is no obligation to pay the said rent after implied renewal. Since the contract term stipulated in the said lease agreement is for two years from September 1, 2006, Plaintiff 9 can only receive a rent based on the total sales amount after the said contract term, but cannot receive a rent based on the sales amount. Thus, Plaintiff 9’s claim cannot be accepted.

However, according to the above facts, the lease contract of this case is automatically extended from six to one month before the expiration of the term of the lease unless the parties notify the change of the term of the contract between six to one month. This is reasonable to view that the defendant would pay the plaintiff 9 the amount determined by 7% per annum of the sales amount regardless of the total sales amount to the plaintiff 9 in monthly rent. This condition is also applicable to the automatic extended lease between the plaintiff 9. Thus, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

(2) Claim for the completion of extinctive prescription equivalent to the difference in monthly rent

Since the Defendant’s above monthly rent claim by Plaintiff 9 is a claim required for the short-term extinctive prescription of three years, it is asserted that the three years passed earlier as of July 10, 2013 and the claim equivalent to the difference between the monthly rent and June 2010 has expired all by prescription.

On the other hand, the above monthly rent claim is "interest, support fees, salaries, usage fees, and other claims for the payment of money or other things as specified within a period of not more than one year" (Article 163 subparagraph 1 of the Civil Act). If the above claims are not exercised for three years, the prescription expires unless it is exercised for three years, and it is evident in the record that the plaintiff 9 submitted to the court of the first instance on July 10, 2013 the "application for amendment of the purport of the claim of this case" to the effect that "the claim corresponding to the monthly rent difference against the defendant" was sought. Thus, if calculated for three years thereafter, the claim equivalent to the difference in the monthly rent of the plaintiff 9 against the defendant before July 9, 2010 has expired by prescription. Thus, the defendant's defense that points this out is justified within the above scope of recognition.

Therefore, the amount equivalent to the monthly rent that the Defendant is liable to pay to the Plaintiff 9 is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent of 3,917,622 won, which is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent from September 2006 to June 2013, which is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent of 3,917,622 won, which is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent from September 1, 2006 to June 2010 (the amount equivalent to the monthly rent from September 1, 2010 to June 9, 201 shall be deemed to have waived the prescription benefit), plus the monthly rent of 14,906,942 won (the amount equivalent to the monthly rent of 1,459,386 won + the difference of the monthly rent of 1,459,386 won + the difference of 923,303 won in June 207 + the difference of the rent of 2,358,206 won in March 16, 296365.

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay calculated at a rate of 19,010,680 won, which is the monthly rent or unjust enrichment from July 1, 2010 to June 2013, as well as at the rate of 20% per annum under the Commercial Act, from July 13, 2013 to December 24, 2013, the date following the delivery of a copy of the application for amendment of the purport of the instant claim, which is the amount equivalent to the monthly rent from July 1, 2010 to June 1, 2013, where it is deemed reasonable for the Defendant to dispute as to the existence or scope of the obligation to perform, as sought by the Plaintiff 9. From July 13, 2013 to the date of complete payment, the Defendant is obligated to pay money calculated at a rate of 8,626,100 won per annum under the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims in this case and the plaintiff 9's claims added in the trial of the case are accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed as they are without merit. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with some different conclusions, the plaintiff 9's claims added in the plaintiffs' appeal and the trial of the court of first instance shall be partially accepted and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be modified as above

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Il-tae (Presiding Judge)