A. The Defendants’ act of arresting Defendant A constitutes an unlawful performance of official duties. Thus, even if the Defendants exercised physical evidence against the police officers during the process of resisting such unlawful performance of official duties, the Defendants’ act constitutes self-defense as an act to escape from an unfair infringement due to an illegal arrest. (ii) As to the offense of insult (Defendant B, C), Defendant B, and C, it cannot be deemed that the humiliation used by the Defendants constituted an insulting speech that may damage the social assessment of the victims’ personal values. Even if there is room to view that the Defendants’ act constitutes an insulting speech that does not violate the social rules in light of the circumstances leading up to the Defendants’ desire.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unfair sentencing (Defendant A: imprisonment for eight months, a stay of execution for two years/Defendant B: imprisonment for six months, a stay of execution for two years/Defendant C: imprisonment for one year, a stay of execution for two years, and a course of violence therapy for 80 hours) is too unreasonable.

2. Judgment on misconception of facts and misapprehension of legal principles

A. As to the crime of obstruction of the performance of official duties of police officers, Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the person may arrest a flagrant offender without a warrant. In order to arrest a flagrant offender, the necessity of the arrest, i.e., the necessity of escape or destruction of evidence, in addition to the punishment of the act, the current nature of the crime, and the apparentness of the crime (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Do3029, Jan. 26, 1999). The determination of whether a flagrant offender satisfies the requirements for arrest of a flagrant offender should be made based on the situation at the time of arrest, and there is considerable room for discretion in determining the subject of investigation.