2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

3.Paragraph 1 and 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance

This part of the judgment of the court is identical to the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, this part of the judgment is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420

In full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in each statement or image of Gap evidence Nos. 1, 3, 4 and Eul evidence Nos. 2, 3, and 4 (including serial numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) upon the Defendant’s determination as to the cause of the claim, the Defendant was in arrears with two or more rents for May 20, 2015 at the time of July 20, 2015, including the rent of KRW 600,000, and the rent of KRW 600,000 for June 20, 2015. Accordingly, it is recognized that the Plaintiff notified the Defendant that the instant sub-lease contract was terminated on July 20, 2015 on the ground of two or more rents.

Therefore, the instant sub-lease contract was lawfully terminated due to the Plaintiff’s declaration of intention to terminate the contract on the grounds of more than two rent delay around July 20, 2015.

(1) The Plaintiff asserted that the time when the sub-lease contract of this case was terminated is around December 17, 2015, when a duplicate of the complaint of this case was delivered to the Defendant. However, the Plaintiff expressed his/her intention to terminate the contract of this case to the Defendant around July 20, 2015, and the Defendant also asserted that the sub-lease contract of this case was terminated on or around July 2015, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the time of termination of the contract is without merit. According to the overall purport of each statement and argument as to unjust enrichment or claim for damages, the amount of unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent for determining the claim for unjust enrichment or damages, and the amount of the sewage and electricity charges equivalent to the amount of the instant real estate from December 2015, it appears that the Defendant used the instant real estate from July 2015 to December 12, 2015, according to the statement by the witness F of the first instance trial.