1. Criminal facts have been proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact-finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court: (1) the Defendant’s operation of the childcare center of this case and reported the appointment and dismissal of childcare teachers; (2) the Defendant made a false appointment report on G and H; (3) the improvement expenses of treatment in this case constitute subsidies for infant care care teachers under Article 36 of the former Infant Care Act (amended by Act No. 10789, Jun. 7, 2011; hereinafter the same shall apply); and (2) the former Enforcement Decree of the Infant Care Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2356, Dec. 8, 2011; hereinafter the same shall apply).

Based on its determination that it is reasonable to view it, we did not accept the allegation of the grounds of appeal by misunderstanding the facts and misapprehending the legal principles.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal disputing the part of finding facts based on the judgment of the court below is nothing more than denying the judgment of the court of fact-finding on the selection and probative value of evidence, which actually belongs to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding. In addition, even when examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles, relevant statutes and the evidence duly admitted, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for the payment of status offenders, the concept of subsidies and the payment of treatment costs, or exceeding

2. Regarding the prosecutor's grounds for appeal

(a) Violation of the Infant Care Act due to the lending of title;