1. In order for an industrial action of workers to be lawful, the first main agent of the industrial action shall be the one who can be the one for collective bargaining, second, the purpose of the industrial action shall be to create autonomous negotiations between the labor and management to improve working conditions, third, the industrial action shall be commenced in compliance with the procedure stipulated by the law, such as the consent and decision of the union members, unless there are special circumstances, and fourth, the industrial action shall be in harmony with the employer's property rights and shall not constitute the exercise of violence, and fourth, if the means and method of the industrial action are various purposes and part of the industrial action is not legitimate, the propriety of the industrial action shall be determined by the legitimacy of the main and genuine purpose of the industrial action, and if it is deemed that the industrial action was not conducted without any unfair requirement, the whole industrial action shall not be justified, and if it is deemed that the industrial action was conducted with respect to the industrial action of the industrial union's collective action of the same kind, it shall be deemed that the collective action of the union members and its branch offices are no more reasonable than 20.

2. The judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court of first instance, which acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning, found that the industrial action of this case was conducted by the Intervenor 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor 5”) against the Plaintiff’s act of departing from the workplace, which is the cause of the industrial action of this case, and asserted its justification. The court below held that the industrial action of this case was conducted by the 10th members of the industrial action of this case by the 1st members of the industrial union and the 1st members of the industrial action of this case, and that the industrial action of this case was conducted by the 1st members of the industrial union and the 5th members of the industrial action of this case without the consent of the 5th members of the industrial action of this case, and that the industrial action of this case was conducted by the 1st members of the industrial union and the 4th members of the industrial action of this case without the consent of the 1st members of the 5th members of the industrial action of this case, and that the industrial action of this case was conducted within the 1st members of the industrial action of this case.

However, we cannot accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

The following circumstances may be revealed even based on the facts acknowledged in the judgment of the court of first instance as partially accepted by the court below and the court below. Metal labor unions sent 2004 wages and collective agreements to collaborative companies, and thereafter delegated the collective bargaining authority to the president of the intra-company subcontractor to sign collective agreements in 2004. The intra-company subcontractor’s association first promoted collective bargaining with collaborative companies, but the collaborative companies failed to comply with such collective bargaining method. Although it was intended to change the form of collective bargaining into individual bargaining and to sign collective agreements with collaborative companies, it did not reach this point, and the metal labor unions concluded two labor disputes with intra-company collaborative companies as employers, and the labor dispute action was conducted by 10 and 150 of the labor dispute action on September 9, 204 and the labor dispute action was conducted by 100 of the total number of labor union members and 103 of the labor dispute action was conducted by 100 of the labor dispute action on September 10, 204.

Examining these circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, in the instant case, metal labor union was scheduled to conduct an industrial action limited to intra-company subcontractor meetings, not a total strike, and thus, the industrial action of this case is lawfully implemented the procedure prescribed in Article 41(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act by obtaining the consent of a majority of the union members as a result of the pro-con voting on the industrial action of this case against union members belonging to the intra-company subcontractor meetings. On the contrary, the first instance court’s determination that the industrial action of this case is not justifiable on the premise that the intra-company subcontractor’s voting on the industrial action of this case should be conducted for each affiliate company, not the intra-company subcontractor association where the industrial action of this case was scheduled, but the intra-company subcontractor's voting on the pro-con voting on the industrial action of this case was conducted.

In addition, according to the records, the intervenor asserts that 102 members of the intra-company subcontractor association including the dismissed person at the time of the pro-con voting on the industrial action of this case are 102 members, and only some of the persons listed in the list of the intended intra-company subcontractor association (Evidence No. 7) are listed in the electoral register (Evidence No. 8) that is a separate document. On the other hand, the court below should have examined whether the persons listed in the list of intended to intra-company subcontractor association maintain the membership of the intra-company subcontractor association at the time of the pro-con voting on the industrial action of this case.

In addition, when the in-house subcontractor association among the industrial action of this case did not resolve the problem of the number of surplus employees related to the working conditions of △△ enterprise, which is another in-house subcontractor, when November 23, 2004, the industrial action of this case includes the situation where the industrial action of this case was conducted several times after all members of the in-house subcontractor posted a notice to the subcontractor on December 25, 2004, about the industrial action guidelines for the union members belonging to this case. However, as seen above, the industrial action report submitted on November 19, 2004 by the in-house subcontractor, stating that the industrial action of this case was completed at the time of the completion of the industrial action, and the in-house subcontractor association should consider the circumstances where all members of the in-house subcontractor requested collective bargaining to conclude wages and collective agreements on several occasions after the industrial action of this case, and the purpose of the industrial action of this case should not be determined simply without examining the purpose of the industrial action of this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the industrial action of this case was unlawful, and the intervenor's act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legitimacy of industrial action and grounds for disciplinary action, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The intervenor's ground for appeal pointing

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cha Han-sung (Presiding Justice)