A. misunderstanding the legal doctrine, the Defendant is not the owner of a penphone received by the Defendant, and B left a penphone in the Defendant’s room, and C, upon B’s instruction, found a penphone by the Defendant’s room, and the Defendant merely caused it. Thus, it cannot be viewed as “receiving and receiving” a penphone.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which found the defendant guilty of violating the Act on the Control of Narcotics, etc. by Handphones, was erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles.

B. The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (one year of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the assertion of misapprehension of the legal doctrine, the act of shotphone’s “receiving or receiving” column of philophones prohibited by the Narcotics Control Act refers to the act of shotphones without compensation, and the philophones need not be owned by the deliveryr.

Therefore, the defendant was not the owner of a philophone, or was unaware of the fact that the philophone was in the first place.

Even if the Defendant received contact from B and knew of the fact that the object to be delivered was a penphone, it constitutes an act of giving or receiving a penphone, and thus, the Defendant’s assertion of misunderstanding the legal principles is without merit.

B. As to the unfair argument of sentencing, the sentencing is determined within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on statutory penalty, and in addition, in light of the appellate court’s ex post facto nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentence of sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, the first instance judgment is reversed solely on the ground that it is somewhat different from the view of the appellate court.