The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff, including the part arising from the supplementary participation.

The judgment below

According to the reasoning, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant trust contract concluded between B (hereinafter “B”) and the Defendant is null and void as a juristic act contrary to social order, on the ground that it is difficult to readily conclude that B’s conclusion of the instant trust contract constitutes a breach of trust against the Plaintiff, and even if it constitutes a breach of trust, there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant actively participated therein.

Furthermore, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion on the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant trust contract is null and void as a non-representative act, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, including the fact that J, who was newly appointed as the representative director B, duly ratified the instant trust contract.

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the validity of ratification of anti-social order, representation without authority, and abuse of rights, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.