2. According to the records, it is recognized that the Defendant was subject to the disposition of the suspension of a driver's license on November 10, 2016 (from December 6, 2016 to March 15, 2017) on the ground that he/she was convicted of retaliation driving, and that the Defendant was sentenced to the suspension of a driver's license on the grounds that he/she was subject to the said disposition, but the said disposition was revoked on March 17, 2017 when the said judgment became final and conclusive at that time, and the said suspension was revoked on April 40, 2017 (from December 6, 2016 to January 14, 2017).

As such, if the disposition of the driver's license suspension against the defendant was revoked for a period of 100 days, the above disposition of the driver's license suspension becomes retroactively effective as in the case of the cancellation by the administrative litigation procedure, and the defendant became final and conclusive after his obligation to obey the disposition was not originally established.

It should be viewed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2007Do9220, Jan. 31, 2008; 98Do4239, Feb. 5, 199). Therefore, the Defendant’s driving of the instant motor vehicle on February 15, 2017 cannot be deemed as driving without a license.

3. In conclusion, the facts charged in the instant case constitute a case that does not constitute a crime, and thus, a judgment of innocence is rendered pursuant to the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

However, since the defendant cannot obtain consent to the public announcement of the judgment of innocence due to his/her absence on the date of pronouncement, the public announcement of the judgment of innocence is not to be made.