A. 1) The Defendant, as stated in the facts constituting the crime in the lower judgment, did not have any fact that he saw the back of the victim as his hand, and then takes a smell back to the victim’s face (hereinafter “instant claim”).

(2) Even if the Defendant committed an act identical to that described in the above Paragraph (1), such act cannot be deemed as an indecent act by compulsion under the Criminal Act (hereinafter referred to as “tender assertion”).

3) Nevertheless, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant facts charged. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine or misapprehending the legal doctrine.

B. The lower court’s sentencing is too excessive and unreasonable.

C. Although there is no risk of recommitting sexual crimes and there is a special reason not to restrict employment, it is unreasonable for the lower court to order the Defendant to place an employment restriction for three years with institutions related to children and juveniles, etc. and welfare facilities for the disabled.

2. Determination

A. (1) As to the assertion of mistake of facts, etc., (1) The probative value of evidence is left to a judge’s free judgment, but such judgment must be consistent with logical and empirical rules, and the degree of the formation of a conviction to be found guilty in a criminal trial shall be such that there is no reasonable doubt. However, it is not required to exclude all possible doubts, and the rejection of evidence which is recognized as having probative value by causing a suspicion without a reasonable ground is not allowed beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence. Here, “reasonable suspicion” refers to a reasonable doubt as to the probability of facts inconsistent with facts based on logical and empirical rules, not including any question and correspondence.