근로기준법위반
The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
Costs of trial in the trial shall be borne by the defendant.
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Article 26 and Article 35 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 15108, Nov. 28, 2017) shall apply to the defendant at the time of entering into an employment contract with E on May 17, 2017, which is subject to the time of entering into the employment contract, is excluded from the application of the advance notice as an employee under probation, and E is not subject to the proviso to Article 26, and the advance notice of dismissal shall not apply to the case where the remittance business, which is an important business, interferes with the business, or causes property damage, and the pre-announcement of dismissal shall not be applied.
B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (700,000 won of fine) is too unreasonable.
2. Judgment on the assertion of mistake of facts
A. The Defendant stated that when the contract period is at least one year at the bottom of the standard labor contract, 90% of the minimum wage for the period of probation may be paid for three months. Even if so, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the above bottom provision is not applicable since the labor contract with E is not set in the labor contract with E, and it does not seem that E is a worker under probation, since there is no agreement on the period of probation.
B. In addition, considering whether E refused the remittance business without any reason and caused a business trouble or a property damage, it is merely a question with the intent to transfer the relevant evidence, and even if comprehensively considering the above evidence, E shall not be deemed as a case where the intent under the proviso of Article 26 of the above Act has caused a substantial hindrance to the business or a property damage.
C. Therefore, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the facts, and all of the Defendant’s assertion of mistake is groundless.
3. There is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court’s judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing, and the first instance court’s sentencing deviates from the reasonable scope of discretion.