The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant.

1. As to the existence of the obligation to pay the difference in overtime work allowances, the Defendant’s ground of appeal on this part is that the Plaintiffs are not actually engaged in overtime work, and the Plaintiffs do not need overtime work in terms of norms, and in calculating the amount of overtime work allowances, ordinary wages shall be governed by the Labor Standards Act and the overtime work hours shall not be allowed to be selectively applied by applying the 60 hours per month under the collective agreement, not the actual work hours stipulated in the Labor Standards Act, but the collective agreement.

However, a labor-management agreement that excludes allowances to be included in ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act from ordinary wages shall be null and void to the extent that does not meet the standard of the Labor Standards Act. On the other hand, if the hours of overtime work have been recognized by a labor-management agreement in consideration of the characteristics of the working environment, etc., it is not allowed for an employer to dispute working hours on the ground that the actual working hours fall short of the above agreed hours (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da81523, Nov. 29, 2007; 2011Da37797, Sept. 8, 2011, etc.).

The court below is just in rejecting the defendant's assertion in accordance with the above legal principles, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to overtime work allowances.

2. The Defendant’s ground of appeal concerning overtime work allowances in the latter part of the year 2008 is that the wages of street cleaners shall be applied to the wages of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security in 2008 and the above wage agreement shall be applied retroactively from July 1, 2008, since the Plaintiff street cleaners’s overtime work allowances should be calculated based on the actual hours of work in the latter part of the year 2008.

However, wages or retirement allowances for which the right to claim the payment has already occurred are transferred to the worker’s private property area and entrusted to the worker’s disposition. Thus, insofar as the labor union does not obtain an individual consent or authorization from the worker, it cannot perform the act of disposition such as waiver or postponement of payment. Thus, it shall be deemed that the return of wages already paid to the worker under a collective agreement is null and void unless there is an individual consent or authorization from the worker (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da67536, Sep. 29, 200; 2009Da76317, Jan. 28, 2010).

Although the court below did not clearly determine this part, the decision of the court below that the defendant applied the wage agreement in the year 2008, which was entered into with the National Democratic Union Trade Union, retroactively and arranged to return overtime work allowances to the plaintiff's street cleaners in the second half of the year 2008 because there is no evidence to deem that the defendant has obtained individual consent or authorization from the plaintiff's street cleaners, and therefore, the decision of the court below that the defendant is liable to pay the difference in overtime work allowances in the second half of the year 2008 is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim Gin-young

Justices Lee Ki-taik