[2] The case holding that if the victim of a traffic accident suffers from a self-scopic symptoms, such as complete paralysis and part-time paralysis, and the external stress disorder associated with the symptoms remains after the symptoms, the victim's labor ability should be deemed to be entirely lost during the period of hospitalization for treatment of the symptoms

[3] Criteria for determining the duration of a testamentary gift after injury

[4] The case holding that if a medical specialist in charge of physical assessment of the victim of a traffic accident made a medical judgment that the after-duty stress disorder caused by an accident is permanent, the determination cannot be excluded from the circumstances to be considered in the decision of the period of the post-post gift just because he did not present the basis for determination or did not respond to a fact inquiry by

1. As to Plaintiff 1’s ground of appeal

A. As to the first ground for appeal

The binding force of the judgment of the court of final appeal is limited to the lower court that has been remanded or transferred (Article 436(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 8 of the Court Organization Act). Therefore, the binding force of the Supreme Court Decision 2005Da15451 Decided December 23, 2005, which the above plaintiff asserted in the ground of appeal in this part of this part of this case, does not affect the case, not the case, but the case, and there is room to deem that the above judgment remains to a certain degree of aftermathy disability to the extent that it cannot be viewed as normal even if it is not the degree of complete paralysis of the above plaintiff. Thus, it is apparent that the above plaintiff does not include the judgment that there exists a disorder in the complete paralysis and the aftermathy disability of the upper part of the plaintiff. Therefore, the ground of appeal on this point is without merit

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

(1) As to the remaining complete paralysis, the aftermath of the upper part part part of the horse, the transition disorder, etc.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is just in rejecting the above plaintiff's assertion that the above plaintiff suffered complete paralysis and aftermathy disability caused by the traffic accident in this case, or that the symptoms that he does not use the death as he intended after the traffic accident in this case constitute a conversion disorder caused by a mental person, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

(2) As to the temporary shutdown damage during the period of hospitalization

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the above plaintiff lost 10% labor ability of the above 10% of the accident of this case and received hospital treatment for about 17 months from the date of the accident of this case, and therefore, the whole period of hospitalization should be included in the calculation of the above plaintiff's business suspension damage. According to the evidence of this case, the court below determined that the above plaintiff's total period of hospitalization from 20,000 to 10,000 to 20,000,0000 from 20,000,0000,000,000 from 20,000,000,000,000 from 2,000,000,000,000 from 2,00,000,000,000 from 2,00,000,000 from 2,00,000 from 2,01,01.

However, such determination by the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

In general, in cases of receiving hospitalized treatment due to an accident, barring any special circumstance to deem that the whole or part of the hospitalized treatment is unreasonable, such as that the period of hospitalization is clearly long-term in light of the injury, the degree and progress of the treatment, etc., even though the treatment is not related to the accident in question or is medically unnecessary, it should be deemed that the labor ability has been lost during the period of hospitalization due to the accident (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da49521, Jun. 9, 200; 2003Da49252, Dec. 12, 2003).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, even after the above plaintiff was hospitalized for about 17 months from the date of the accident in this case until December 3, 2002, the above plaintiff had a self-conceptic symptoms, such as the complete paralysis, the parte parte parte parte parte parte part parte parte part parte parte part parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte part parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte parte part parte parte parte part parte parte parte parte parte part parte parte parte parte part parte part parte part parte part parte part parte part parte part part parte part part part part parte part part part part

Nevertheless, the court below recognized that the above plaintiff's above plaintiff's ability to work was lost only during the period of hospitalization from October 4, 2001 after the accident of this case during the 17-month period, and did not recognize the subsequent period of hospitalization, which erred by misapprehending the legal principles on loss of labor ability during the period of hospitalization or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

(3) As to the continuous period of external stress disorder

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the above plaintiff was unable to believe that the above plaintiff's external stress disorder is permanent disability since a medical specialist in charge of physical reexamination on the part of the court below stated that the above plaintiff's physical reexamination on the part of the defendant's physical reexamination on the part of the defendant is permanently expected to suffer from nephical disorder, such as external stress disorder, etc., but it is hard to believe that the above plaintiff's physical reexamination on the part of the court below's above physical reexamination on the ground that the above plaintiff's physical reexamination on the result of the above physical reexamination on the part of the court below was permanently disabled. However, the above plaintiff's physical reexamination on the part of the accident of this case, the accident of this case, the accident of this case, the above plaintiff suffered from nephye at the time of the accident of this case, and the above plaintiff complained of severe distress disorder, and the plaintiff was suffering from the above accident of this case since May 204 of this case's accident of this case, and the accident of this case was modified with the driver's license of this case.

However, the medical judgment should be determined by the empirical rules in consideration of the specific contents of the post-treatment, the age of the victim, the nature of occupation and work experience (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Da25339, Sept. 27, 1994; 95Da28410, Oct. 12, 1995; 95Da28410, Oct. 12, 1995; 95Da28410, etc.). The above medical judgment cannot be excluded from the circumstances to consider the above medical judgment solely on the ground that the medical specialist in charge of the above physical assessment did not present any basis for the medical judgment that the above plaintiff's post-accident stress disorder is permanent, or did not reply to the fact-finding by the court below on the basis thereof. Since it is unclear in the record that the grounds for deeming the post-accident stress disorder of the above plaintiff is considered one of two to ten years, it is difficult to conclude that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the above plaintiff's post-accident stress disorder disorder of the above.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below that recognized the above plaintiff's external stress disorder as the temporary disability for ten years from the date of the accident in this case was erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the continuous period of testamentary gift, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

The court's right to request the proof is not required to urge the court to provide evidence in all cases where it is evident that the parties are not able to prove due to ignorance, negligence, or misunderstanding in light of the nature of a lawsuit, and the facts in dispute are not proven (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da38442 delivered on February 27, 1998), unless it is the only evidence of the parties' assertion, the court may freely decide whether to accept evidence, unless it is the sole evidence of the parties' assertion (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da19121 delivered on July 26, 1991).

According to the records, the court below adopted an application for the above plaintiff's rehabilitation department, mental disorder and physical examination commissioned on May 26, 2006 to prove that the above plaintiff's symptoms were transitioned to 20. The court below rejected the above plaintiff's request for 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 20 days after 3 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 7 days after 20 days after 3 days after 3 days after 20 days after 7 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 7 days after 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 3 days after 3 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 3 days after 20 days after 20 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 3 days after 20 days after 2.

2. As to Plaintiff 2’s ground of appeal

The above plaintiff did not submit a statement of grounds of appeal within the statutory period and did not state the grounds of appeal in the petition of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the above plaintiff 1 regarding loss of lost income due to suspension of business and stress disorder during the hospitalization period of the plaintiff 1 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to Seoul High Court, and all remaining appeals of the plaintiff 1 and the appeal of the plaintiff 2 are dismissed. The costs of appeal by the plaintiff 2 are assessed against the above plaintiff 2. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Nung-hwan (Presiding Justice)