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(영문) 대법원 2019. 7. 10. 선고 2018다295677 판결

[소유권이전등기][미간행]

Main Issues

[1] The presumption history of registration completed under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Forest Land and its meaning of false letter of guarantee or written confirmation

[2] Whether the presumption of registration is broken solely on the ground that the person who completed the registration under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Ownership of Forest Land has asserted different from that stated in a letter of guarantee or a written confirmation as to the cause of acquisition

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 5 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land (Act No. 2111 of May 21, 1969), Article 186 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 5 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land (Act No. 2111 of May 21, 1969), Article 186 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2000Da33775 Decided October 27, 2000 (Gong2000Ha, 2413), Supreme Court en banc Decision 2000Da7138, 71395 Decided November 22, 2001 (Gong2002Sang, 129), Supreme Court Decision 2010Da78739 Decided January 27, 201

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and two others (Law Firm Daegu, Attorneys Gyeong-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and one other

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu District Court Decision 2018Na300751 Decided November 15, 2018

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that: (a) the ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate was completed on March 23, 194, following the death of Nonparty 1 on October 19, 1917; and (b) on October 26, 1970, after the death of Nonparty 2, pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Forest Land (amended by Act No. 2111, May 21, 1969; hereinafter “Special Measures Act”) the ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate was completed on May 9, 195 under Nonparty 3 and Nonparty 4; (c) the ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate was completed in the name of Nonparty 6, the heir; (d) the ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate was completed in the name of Nonparty 1; and (e) the inheritance and ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate was presumed to have become effective due to the inheritance registration of Nonparty 3/1, the inheritance and ownership transfer registration of the instant real estate under the name of Nonparty 20.

2. However, we cannot agree with the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

A registration completed under the Act on Special Measures shall be presumed to conform to the substantive legal relationship, and unless it is proved that a false or forged letter of guarantee or confirmation has been issued under the Act on Special Measures or that a registration for transfer has not been duly registered due to other reasons, the presumption of ownership preservation or confirmation shall not be broken. Here, false letter of guarantee or confirmation refers to a letter of guarantee or confirmation which does not fit the truth with the substantive contents of the reason for alteration of a right. In addition, in light of the fact that the special measures allow a registration that does not coincide with the process of alteration of a right to the actual transferee of real estate, the date of purchase, which is later than the date of death of the original owner or the previous registration, or that the name or date of purchase under the letter of guarantee or confirmation is different from that of the original owner or the previous registration, or that there is no clear proof that the registration has been obtained by the former Act on Special Measures, such as 200Da3775 decided Oct. 27, 200, the presumption of the legitimate reason for acquisition of the right cannot be seen as a new one.

3. According to the records, at the first instance court and the lower court, the Defendants asserted that “The instant real estate was inherited by Nonparty 7, who is Nonparty 5’s child after the death of Nonparty 2, and Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3, who is Nonparty 6’s child, and Nonparty 3, were aware that the instant real estate was inherited from Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, and that they consented to the completion of the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Nonparty 3.” In this case, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, inasmuch as the Defendants’ assertion that Nonparty 5 and Nonparty 6 and their inheritors agreed to the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Nonparty 3 is not proven to be true, it cannot be readily concluded that the circumstances as determined by the lower court are alone that the letter of guarantee or confirmation, which served as the basis for the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Nonparty 3, or that

Nevertheless, the lower court did not properly examine and determine whether Nonparty 5, Nonparty 6, or his heir agreed, and determined that the presumption of ownership transfer registration of this case was broken solely based on the circumstances indicated in its reasoning. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the presumption of registration completed in accordance with the Act on Special Measures, or a false letter of guarantee or confirmation, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kwon Soon-il (Presiding Justice)