2. It is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, if the first instance court did not change the conditions of sentencing, and if the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect them. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to reverse the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the difference between the appellate court’s opinion and the first instance judgment is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, in light of the foregoing, the court did not submit new data on sentencing as it did not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and even if all the grounds for sentencing specified in the instant pleadings are comprehensive, it is not recognized that the first instance judgment was too excessive to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition (Article 25 (1) of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure; however, it is corrected that the part of the judgment of the court below "as a crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Epik Vehicles)" in the 3th page 8 is deemed to be "a crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Epik Vehicles)."