2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has the unique area of the first instance court

In addition, considering these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Since new sentencing materials have not been submitted in the instant case, compared to the original judgment, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the original judgment, and even when considering all the reasons for sentencing as stated by the lower court, it is not recognized that the lower court’s sentencing was too unhued and so it exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's argument of unfair sentencing cannot be accepted.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.