2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition, considering these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the aforementioned sentence to the Defendant on the grounds stated in its reasoning for sentencing. In light of the following: (a) the circumstance unfavorable to the sentencing alleged by the prosecutor in the trial of the lower court, such as the Defendant’s wearing a uniform and assaulting a police officer who properly performed official duties, is not good; (b) the circumstance unfavorable to the sentencing alleged by the prosecutor in the trial of the lower court is sufficiently taken into account when determining the sentence at the lower court; (c) the Defendant led to the confession and reflect of the offense; (d) the degree of violence the Defendant committed is difficult to deem that the degree of violence the Defendant committed is significant compared with similar cases; and (e) there is no history of criminal punishment for obstruction of performance of official duties prior to the instant case, the lower court’s judgment does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion; and (e) there is no

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion.