1. The part of the grounds of appeal as to whether the plaintiffs' special lecture hours are included in contractual work hours

A. Article 18(3) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 15513, Mar. 20, 2018; hereinafter the same) provides that “Article 55 (Holidays) and Article 60 (Annual Paid Leave) shall not apply to an employee whose average weekly working hours are less than 15 hours.” In addition, Article 4 of the Act on the Guarantee of Workers’ Retirement Benefits provides that “The same shall not apply to an employee whose continuous working period is less than one year, whose average weekly working hours are less than 15 hours, and whose average weekly working hours are less than 15 hours.” In this context, the term “fixed working hours” refers to working hours determined between the employee and the employer within the scope of working hours under Articles 50 and 69 of the former Labor Standards Act or Article 46 of the Industrial Safety and Health Act (Article 2(1)7 of the former Labor Standards Act).

B. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

(1) The Plaintiffs worked as English instructors in the Defendant’s ○○ Private Teaching Institute (hereinafter “Defendant’s Private Teaching Institute”). The Defendant’s Private Teaching Institutes operated in the form of the Defendant’s Private Teaching Institutes established the special lectures for each subject necessary to supplement, deepene, improve the performance of the students, etc. according to the results of the questionnaire organized in accordance with the regular schedule of time, and assign students, including the Plaintiffs. Although all students were not allowed to attend the special lectures, the Defendant’s Private Teaching Institutes organized the special lectures by classifying the subjects of the lectures by the literature, the department, the department, the upper and lower class, etc., so that students may select the special lectures as necessary.

(2) The special lecture took place during the seven-month period beginning on March 1 or April 200, and was demoted at the Defendant’s educational institute.

(3) The Defendant’s private teaching institute prepared a schedule by day, wherein the regular lecture, questioning answer time, and special lecture time are written, and made a lecture in accordance with the schedule of that time. From 1st to 6th of that week, the regular lecture was mainly organized for the hours from 6th of that week, and the special lecture was mainly organized for 7, 8th of that week’s regular lecture and for the night practice time, and for the weekends.

(4) On the school affairs prepared by the Defendant Private Teaching Institutes, the details of the special lecture (the subject, the name of the instructor, the team, the frequency, time, etc.) are recorded in detail by the date, and the special lecture is also recorded every day, including whether the instructor to whom the special lecture was assigned was actually demoted, and whether the instructor was dismissed.

(5) Instructors, including the Plaintiffs, received the lecture and the fixed remuneration according to the schedule of the lecture determined by the Defendant’s driving school. In the case of the special lecture, 50% of the tuition fees paid by the students was paid to the students.

C. In full view of the following circumstances revealed in light of the aforementioned factual basis, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs’ special lecture hours in Defendant Private Teaching Institutes are also included in the Plaintiffs’ contractual work hours, as in the regular class of lecture and interpellation response time.

(1) The Defendant’s driving school determined whether to establish or abolish a special lecture. At the time the Defendant’s driving school was established and allocated, the instructors provided special lectures to the students of the Defendant’s driving school at the designated place.

(2) The Defendant Private Teaching Institutes, which is the Defendant Private Teaching Institutes, have managed the schedule of students including the hours of regular class lecture and questioning. To this end, the Defendant Private Teaching Institutes and instructors seem to have determined the establishment, allocation, payment of remuneration, etc. of the special class lecture, and the Defendant Private Teaching Institutes seem to have managed and supervised the special class of instructors in detail.

(3) On the ground that the Plaintiffs received 50% of the tuition fees paid by the students in return for the special lectures, such remuneration cannot be deemed as not being paid as remuneration for work.

D. Therefore, the lower court should have determined whether the Defendant, including the contractual work hours, is obligated to pay the Plaintiffs the amount of weekly holiday allowance and annual holiday work allowance, and whether the Defendant is obligated to pay retirement allowance. Nevertheless, the lower court, solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning, presumed that the contractual work hours are not included in the Plaintiffs’ contractual work hours, and concluded that the Plaintiffs’ weekly holiday allowance and annual holiday work allowance are calculated and the claim for retirement allowance is not recognized. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on contractual work hours, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The allegation in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

2. The remaining grounds of appeal concerning weekly holiday allowances are asserted

The lower court rejected the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the extinctive prescription of the claim for weekly holiday allowances was not run on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, such as that, in fact, the existence of rights or the possibility of exercise of rights could not be deemed as legal disability even if

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on extinctive prescription.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the part against the plaintiffs among the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)