[2] In a case where the defendant, using a postnatal care center for Gap's operation, posted any inconvenience that he directly experienced on the Internet carpets or his tables, etc. in the form of a post, thereby impairing Gap's reputation, and was prosecuted for violating the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., the case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to "the purpose of slandering people" in the judgment below convicting the defendant, even though it is difficult to see that the defendant had

[2] The case holding that in case where Defendant was indicted of violation of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. with the content that Defendant, using a postnatal care center for Gap's operation, posted a pro boot Internet camera or one's blogs, etc. related to pregnancy, childcare, etc. on nine occasions in the form of a post, thereby impairing Gap's reputation, the case held that Defendant's alleged facts are reasonable in light of the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant's material contents indicated in the Internet blogs were consistent with objective facts; (b) the Defendant's publication of this article is limited to Internet carpets or the Internet users searching for the information of postnatal care centers; and (c) it is difficult to view that the Defendant's alleged facts are indiscreetly exposed to the users of the Internet blogs, etc.; and (d) it is reasonable to see that there was an incidental motive or purpose of defamation for the benefit of pregnant or nursing women seeking information about postnatal care centers, and that there is an incidental motive or purpose of defamation for public interest.

1. “Purpose of slandering a person” under Article 70(1) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. is required to express an intent or purpose. Whether a person is intended to defame a person should be determined by comparing and considering all the circumstances regarding the expression itself, such as the content and nature of the relevant facts, the scope of the other party to whom the relevant fact was published, and the method of expression, and the degree of infringement of reputation that may be damaged or damaged by such expression. Furthermore, if the alleged facts conflict with those for public interest in the direction of an actor’s subjective intention, the purpose of slandering a person, barring any special circumstance, is denied. It includes not only the State, society, and other general public interest but also the purpose of expressing a specific social group or its entire members’ interest and interest (see Supreme Court Decisions 208Do812, May 28, 2009; 201Do13216, Nov. 21, 2010). 206.

Meanwhile, the State shall guarantee under the conditions as prescribed by the Act the consumer protection movement to guide sound consumption activities and to urge the improvement of quality of products (Article 124 of the Constitution); consumers have the right to be provided with knowledge and information necessary to select goods or services and to reflect consumers’ opinions on their business activities, etc. (Article 4 of the Framework Act on Consumers); as the market environment centered on consumers is transferred to the center of consumers, the need to provide and exchange information and opinions on goods or services through the Internet to reduce the information gap between the business operators and consumers increases; therefore, the aforementioned circumstances should be carefully examined and determined as to whether consumers using goods or services have the intent to slander the acts of Slandering the business operators on the basis of the objective facts they have experienced on the Internet.

2. The lower court determined that the Defendant posted the above article with intent to defame the victim when considering the details, contents, and method of expression, etc. of the writing posted on the Internet camera, which was an information and communications network from December 26, 201 to the 30th day of the same month.

3. However, we cannot accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

A. Review of the evidence duly adopted and examined and the record reveals the following facts:

1) On December 12, 2011, the Defendant: (a) given birth to a child; and (b) took care of KRW 2.5 million from the postnatal care center in the instant operation of the instant postnatal care center in which the Defendant reported and promised to take advantage of another person’s use; and (c) took care of KRW 2.5 million from December 14, 201 to December 27, 2011.

2) On December 26, 201, from around 16:17 to 01:29 of the same month, the Defendant posted a post post for the use of the postnatal care center of this case on nine occasions, such as a name Internet camera or one’s tables related to pregnancy, childcare, etc. The Defendant posted a post for the use of the postnatal care center of this case. The Defendant also expressed that the Defendant expressed that the instant post-care center is friendly and good, while referring to the fact that there are many kinds of postnatal care centers, she will assist pregnant or nursing women who will use the postnatal care center in selecting a prudent postnatal care center.

3) The main contents of the writing posted by the Defendant, such as the breakdown of the hot water boiler, noise between the postnatal care room, and food between the Defendant and the postnatal care room, are to inform the Defendant of the inconvenience that the Defendant had experienced directly in the postnatal care center of 13-day 14 days, or to demand and use refund, and to make it possible for the Defendant to respond to the Defendant’s claim for damages in the event of damage to the postnatal care center by using the Defendant’s clause that the Defendant would cause damage to the postnatal care center, or to repeatedly delete the Defendant’s use period. On the Defendant’s writing posted on the Internet car page, there has been active discussions on the part of the Defendant, such as: (a) indicating the Defendant’s official seal in a way that the Kapets members expressed their comments in the way that the Defendant would have been prone; and (b) making the Defendant’s Kapets members sent in the postnatal care center with the Defendant and the Defendant’s attitude that is high in the new birth room.

B. The following circumstances can be revealed from these facts: ① if the Defendant used the instant post care center as a consumer who actually used the instant post care center and used the subjective assessment thereof; ② The instant text also used a somewhat exaggerated expression such as “victim’s response” but it points out the problem of the victim’s attitude corresponding to the complaints raised by the Defendant who experienced rapid and sensitive changes due to childbirth; ③ the information on post care centers is related to the interests and interests of the pregnant or nursing women before giving birth; ③ the Defendant also expressed the motive that the Defendant posted the instant post care center to help the Defendant choose the post care center, and ④ it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s use of the said post care center is more reasonable and unreasonable than the Defendant’s free use of the given post care center solely on the grounds that it is difficult to view that there is no other motive or purpose to use the post care center as one of its members, ④ it is difficult to see that the Defendant’s use of the given post care center was unconstitutional than the Defendant’s desire to freely choose the post care center.

C. Nevertheless, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case on the grounds stated in its reasoning. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “the purpose of slandering people,” which is an element of defamation under Article 70(1) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice)