On September 6, 2018, around 00:22, the Defendant driven Dbenz car at the second floor parking lot of Songpa-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government B apartment Cdong, with a blood alcohol concentration of about 0.188% in the parking lot under the influence of alcohol concentration of about 20 meters.

2. Article 2 subparagraph 26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that the term "driving" means the use of a vehicle on the road in accordance with its original use. The concept of "driving" refers to the use of the vehicle on the road in accordance with its original use. Since the concept of "driving" includes a purpose element in light of the content of the provision, it means only intentional driving, and it does not constitute driving in a case where a vehicle is driven without any intention

Therefore, without any intention to allow any person to drive a motor vehicle, the motor vehicle was driven by the motor vehicle engine for another purpose, and the motor vehicle was driven by the power of driving the motor vehicle, such as the de facto winding machine, etc., with the device necessary for the launch of the motor vehicle, shall not fall under the motor vehicle driving.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2004Do1109 delivered on April 23, 2004). At the time of the instant case, the Defendant’s Doz passenger car (hereinafter “instant vehicle”) in a mixed state under the influence of alcohol is moving to the right-way direction at the time of the instant vehicle, and at the time of the instant vehicle’s moving to the right-way direction, the length of the instant vehicle appears to have changed to the main driving environment. To do so, it is not easy to simultaneously conduct the said two acts in the following direction, at the same time, at the vehicle’s moving to the right-hand direction, the direction of the instant vehicle is the right-hand direction, and it is the last vehicle than the first vehicle.