2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. The Plaintiff is the owner of BNAS car first registered on August 9, 2012 (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

B. Around 23:00 on June 20, 2014, the Defendant, as an insurer, entered into a comprehensive automobile insurance contract (hereinafter “Defendant vehicle”), caused an accident that shocks the back part of the Plaintiff vehicle parked on the front road of luminous C while leaving brooms around 23:00.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant accident”). C.

Plaintiff

A vehicle was destroyed by the instant accident, both back penter, back gateer, and ridge, etc., and the Defendant paid KRW 11,481,800 as insurance proceeds at the repair cost of the Plaintiff’s vehicle (85%) equivalent to the ratio of the fault of the Defendant’s vehicle (85%) on August 4, 2014.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, entry and video of Eul evidence of Nos. 1 to 3 (including virtual numbers) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of action

A. Although the Plaintiff’s assertion was repaired on the damaged parts of the Plaintiff’s vehicle due to the instant accident, it was impossible to repair the completed part of the Plaintiff’s vehicle to restore it to its original state, resulting in the Plaintiff’s loss, such as decline in the exchange value of the Plaintiff vehicle. Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay KRW 6,125,00, which is the

B. In a case where an article is damaged due to an illegal act in the board, if possible, the damage shall be the cost of repair, and if the repair is impossible, the decrease in the exchange value shall be deemed ordinary damages. If the repair is possible, the damage caused by the decline in the exchange value in addition to the repair cost shall be deemed as a special damage.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2012Da115298 Decided December 11, 2014, and Supreme Court Decision 81Da8 Decided June 22, 1982, and Supreme Court Decision 91Da42883 Decided March 10, 1992, etc.). In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, first of all, entry of No. 1 (e.g., evidence No. 1) appears consistent with the Plaintiff’s assertion as to whether the parts are impossible to repair the Plaintiff’s vehicle even after repair remains.