A. Defendant 1) Fact-misunderstanding and misapprehension of legal principles, Defendant 1 purchased the instant other aid from K from K to KRW 120,000,000, but if the Defendant could not pay the other aid, K may cancel the other aid sales contract entered into with the Defendant and receive the other aid of this case possessed by the Defendant. As such, the other aid sales contract entered into between K and the Defendant is merely a claim and a debt relationship under the civil law, and thus, the part against K cannot be established as a crime of fraud.

2) The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (three years of imprisonment and four months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

B. The prosecutor (unfair sentencing)’s sentence is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. The defendant alleged the same purport in the court below's determination as to the defendant's misunderstanding of the facts and the legal principles, and the court below rejected the above assertion in detail by stating in the column "as to the assertion of the defendant A and the counsel and the determination thereof". In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is an error of law by misunderstanding the facts and misunderstanding of the legal principles as alleged by

Therefore, the defendant's mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles are without merit.

3. Determination as to the unjust assertion of sentencing by the defendant and the prosecutor

A. Based on the statutory penalty, the sentencing is determined within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as stipulated in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our criminal litigation law, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area for the first deliberation of sentencing.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion.