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(영문) 대법원 2003. 10. 10. 선고 2003다33165 판결

[건물철거등][공2003.11.15.(190),2179]

Main Issues

[1] Criteria for determining whether a building is a solid building under Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code

[2] The case holding that even if a building was built of a wooden pole, it constitutes a solid building under Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code if the wall is composed of bricks and cement block, roof is composed of mortars for a considerable period of time and it cannot be easily dismantled

Summary of Judgment

[1] Whether it is a solid building under Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code shall be determined by considering physical and chemical external strength or fire-fighting difficulty of the building and degree of difficulty in dismantling the building.

[2] The case holding that even if a building was built of a wooden pole, if the wall is composed of bricks and cement block, and the roof is composed of mortars for a considerable period of time, and it is not easily dismantled, it constitutes a solid building under Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 280 (1) 1 and 2 of the Civil Code

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2404 delivered on April 12, 198 (Gong1988, 839) Supreme Court Decision 95Da9075, 9082 delivered on July 28, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2975) Supreme Court Decision 96Da40080 delivered on January 21, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 608)

Plaintiff, Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Han-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellee

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Incheon District Court Decision 2001Na3139 delivered on June 5, 2003

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, after compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in the judgment, and found that all the land and buildings of this case were owned by the defendant at the time when the right to collateral security was established with respect to the land of this case. Among them, since the right to collateral security was established only on the land of this case, but only on July 12, 1985 at the auction procedure to enforce the right to collateral security, the land of this case was sold to the non-party and the owner of the land of this case were different from each other, the defendant acquired the right to collateral right to own the land of this case. In light of the records, the above determination of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence or the misapprehension of the legal ground for the establishment of legal superficies, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Whether it is a solid building stipulated in Article 280(1)1 of the Civil Act shall be determined by comprehensively taking account of physical and chemical external strength or fire resistance and difficulty in dismantling a building (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da40080 delivered on January 21, 1997).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, with regard to the plaintiff's assertion that "the building of this case is a wooden building, and the statutory superficies for its ownership has expired 15 years after the lapse of the duration stipulated in Article 280 (1) 2 of the Civil Code, since it is the wooden building, the court below determined that the building of this case has a pole on the foundation of a wooden foundation, the wall of this case has a brick, up to about 20-30cm above the upper floor, and the wall of this case has a brick, and the roof has been formed by a cement block. Accordingly, according to this, the building of this case has the internal ability for a considerable period of time, and the building cannot be easily dismantled because it constitutes a solid building as defined in Article 280 (1) 1 of the Civil Code, the duration of statutory superficies is 30 years, and the relevant evidence is examined in light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court below is justified and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to statutory superficies or the ground for appeal.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

This part of the ground of appeal concerning abuse of rights or violation of the principle of trust and good faith cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal against the judgment of the court below, and even after examining the records, it cannot be deemed that the defendant's defense to acquire legal superficies against the plaintiff's claim of this case violates the principle of trust and good faith or constitutes abuse of rights. Thus, the above ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)