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(영문) 광주고등법원(제주) 2019.08.14 2019누1168

토석채취사업 개발행위변경허가신청반려처분

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1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

Reasons

The reasoning for the court of this case is as stated in the reasoning for the judgment of the first instance except for the plaintiff's determination as to the contents asserted in the court of first instance as stated in the following Paragraph 2. Thus, this case is cited as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

The Plaintiff’s additional determination on the Plaintiff’s assertion is a disposition practically restricting the Plaintiff’s rights and interests, and the Defendant, in advance, issued a prior notice under the Administrative Procedures Act (Article 21(1)) and hearing of opinions (Article 22(3)) without going through such procedures.

Therefore, the instant disposition is unlawful due to procedural defects.

Judgment

Unless there are special circumstances, even if the disposition of rejection on the application is not imposed upon the parties, it does not directly restrict the rights and interests of the parties, so it does not constitute a "disposition that restricts the rights and interests of the parties" and therefore, it cannot be said that it is subject to prior notice or hearing of opinions.

(see Supreme Court Decision 2014Du1628, Nov. 23, 2017). The instant disposition constitutes a disposition refusing a request for extension of the period of permission of the instant case previously received by the Plaintiff by December 31, 2018.

According to the above legal principles, since the disposition of this case does not directly restrict the rights and interests of the plaintiff, it is not subject to prior notice or hearing of opinions.

On a different premise, the Defendant’s above assertion is without merit.

The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the disposition of this case does not extend the period of permission and thus, the obligation to restore the mountainous district arises to the Plaintiff when the existing period of permission expires. Thus, the above disposition constitutes a disposition that substantially restricts the Plaintiff’s rights and interests.