2. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part relating to the participation shall be borne by the Plaintiff Intervenor, and the remainder shall be borne by the Plaintiff. On May 2, 2014, the disposition of imposition of KRW 32,858,120, corporate tax of KRW 19,50,160, and value-added tax of KRW 2,2010, imposed on the Plaintiff on May 2, 2014 by the Defendant at the office, respectively, of KRW 1,50,160, corporate tax of KRW 1,00,30,270, and KRW 501,717,980 for year 201.

A. The lawsuit for damages related to aircraft noise between residents in the vicinity of the original airfield and the Osan Airfield (hereinafter “the lawsuit for damages of this case”) was initiated as indicated below. At the time of appointment of the plaintiff as a resident’s attorney, the plaintiff’s assistant intervenor (hereinafter “the intervenor”) who was the representative attorney at the time of appointment of the plaintiff as the resident’s attorney was brought in the lawsuit.

B. From March 11, 201 to July 6, 2012, Korea deposited the total of KRW 17,793,000,000 for damages under the instant lawsuit for damages claim (i.e., the total of KRW 624,00,000 for compensation related to the original airfield + KRW 17,169,000 for compensation related to the Lao airfield) into the Korea-Japan bank account under the Plaintiff’s name. The Defendant: (a) deemed that the Plaintiff was omitted from the amount of income of KRW 4,012,952,227, such as the fees not paid to the residents from the damages claim as described in the foregoing paragraph (b); and (b) deemed that the Plaintiff omitted from the amount of income; and (b) made a correction and notification of corporate tax and value-added tax (hereinafter “each of the instant dispositions”).

D. On June 16, 2014, the Plaintiff dissatisfied with each of the instant dispositions, filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal, but was dismissed on November 2014.

[Basis] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-1 to 4, evidence 9-5, 6, 12, 14, Eul evidence 1-1 to 4, 2, 3-1, 2-2, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) Since the Plaintiff’s representative attorney-at-law, who operated the Seocho Branch Office, deemed that the fees, etc. in this case were reverted to the Intervenor, not the Plaintiff, pursuant to the principle of substantial taxation, each of the dispositions in this case is unlawful on different premise. (2) The Defendant rendered each of the dispositions in this case on May 1, 2014 on the premise that the entire amount of the fees, etc. in this case was attributed to the Intervenor, even though the Plaintiff notified that the amount equivalent to the fees, etc. in this case was attributed to the Intervenor as bonus, the amount equivalent to the fees, etc. in this case was attributed to the Intervenor. (3) Since each of the dispositions in this case is inconsistent with or overlapping with the notification of change in the above income amount, each of the dispositions in this case was unlawful, since each of the dispositions in this case was unlawful, since the Intervenor filed the lawsuit for damages in this case, while paying the fees, etc. in stamp, delivery fees, appraisal fees, etc., the Defendant did not include the above amount in the deductible expenses.

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Facts of recognition

1) At the time of establishment on September 3, 2002, the Plaintiff established a principal office in Ansan-si, Seoul, Seocho-gu, Seoul, and additionally established a sub-branch in Seocheon-dong on December 8, 2003, but on June 28, 2004, established a sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-si. 2) inside the Plaintiff, the principal office and the sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-si, the principal office and the sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-si,

3) On June 2010, the Plaintiff dismissed the Intervenor from the representative and expelled the Intervenor from the representative. At the same time, the Plaintiff closed the Seocho Branch Office around July 2010, and the Intervenor opened an individual law office around August 2010.

4) From March 11, 2011 to July 18, 2012, the Plaintiff transferred the instant fee, etc. to the least* bank account, an employee of the Intervenor or the Intervenor.

[Reasons for Recognition] Evidence No. 3, Evidence No. 13-1 to 13, Evidence No. 17, Evidence No. 4, Evidence No. 5, Witness**'s testimony, partial testimony of early stage, and purport of the whole pleadings

D. Determination

1) Determination on the first argument

In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the instant fee, etc. was reverted to the Plaintiff.

① Article 52(1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act prohibits a partner of a law firm from performing his/her attorney-at-law's practice in his/her own account or on the account of a third party.

② As can be seen from the above facts, even if each office was operated by the so-called separate accounting method, such as the appointment of staff, etc. inside the Plaintiff, the remuneration for the services provided by a member attorney-at-law of the law firm shall be deemed to be the revenue of the law firm. In this case, there is no special circumstance to deem that the Intervenor is only the nominal owner of the transaction, such as entering into a litigation delegation contract in his/her name or receiving the fees, etc., even in the instant case, the Intervenor was dismissed from the Plaintiff’s representative on or around June 2010, and the Seocho Branch was closed around July 2010, and the Intervenor opened and operated an individual office from around August 2010.

The plaintiff has already accepted the case by the intervenor and submitted a resignation letter on the case for which the letter of delegation of the lawsuit in the name of the plaintiff was submitted. However, the claim for damages of this case was inevitable because the parties to the lawsuit could not receive a written consent for resignation, and the plaintiff was appointed as a legal representative, and this circumstance should be deemed to have been attributed to the intervenor, while the plaintiff maintained the status of the legal representative until the final and conclusive judgment was rendered. However, as long as the plaintiff received the amount of damages ordered to pay in the judgment, the transaction or income realized in the name of the plaintiff cannot be deemed to have been actually reverted to the intervenor. Therefore, the first argument

2) Judgment on the second argument

The second argument of the plaintiff seems to be that the defendant made a disposition of this case by considering the fees, etc. of this case as the plaintiff's income and the fees, etc. of this case were actually paid to the intervenor, and it is double taxation that imposed income tax on the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff's assertion on the premise that the plaintiff's payment of the fees, etc. of this case was based on the plaintiff's income at the stage of receiving the fees, etc. in return for the service of lawsuit done under his own name, and that the plaintiff's payment of the fees, etc. of this case is based on the bonus disposition against the intervenor as the bonus disposition for the intervenor is different from the taxation stage or object. Thus, both can be divided. In this case, the plaintiff can be recognized as losses within the scope permitted by Article 43 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act by reporting that the fees, etc. of this case should be included in the calculation of losses as the participant's salary at the time of filing the corporate tax return, etc., but the plaintiff merely did not include them in the expenses.

In filing a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages of this case, the Intervenor’s health care room where the Intervenor paid KRW 203,972,200 to recognition stand, etc., and it is not sufficient to acknowledge the partial testimony of a witness assistance team or the statement of Gap evidence No. 21, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it, and it is difficult to deem that the above recognition stand as necessary expenses corresponding to the fees, etc. of this case. Thus, the Plaintiff’s third assertion is without merit.

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.