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(영문) 대법원 2016. 12. 15. 선고 2012도9672 판결

[변호사법위반][미간행]

Main Issues

[1] In a case where a person, other than an attorney-at-law, accepted a legal case from a client and actually acted on behalf of the client for the handling of a case, and actually acted on behalf of the client, whether it constitutes an act of dealing with legal affairs prohibited under Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-law Act even if he/she was entitled to deal with some of the affairs (affirmative)

[2] The meaning of "agent" prohibited by Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act / [2] Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act

Reference Cases

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4356 Decided June 28, 2007 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 99Do2193 Decided December 24, 199 (Gong2000Sang, 349) Supreme Court Decision 2013Da28728 Decided July 24, 2014 (Gong2014Ha, 1712)

Escopics

Defendant 1 and one other

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendants

Judgment of the lower court

Cheongju District Court Decision 2012No36 decided July 19, 2012

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. If a person, other than an attorney-at-law, accepted a legal case from a client and actually acted on behalf of the client as a substantial agent for all the procedures necessary for the client’s application and execution of the case, such act constitutes an act of handling legal affairs prohibited under Article 109 subparag. 1 of the Attorney-at-law Act, even though he/she was entitled to handle some of the administrative affairs (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4356, Jun. 28, 2007, etc.).

In addition, "agent" prohibited under Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act includes not only a legal representative dealing with a legal case under the name of his/her agent, but also a case where using legal knowledge on behalf of himself/herself, or where he/she actually leads the handling of a case on behalf of himself/herself without legal knowledge or where he/she does so only in the external form (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 99Do2193, Dec. 24, 199; 2013Da28728, Jul. 24, 2014).

In addition, criminal facts should be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act).

2. Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court acknowledged that (1) the Defendants: (a) introduced the land (hereinafter “instant land”) as indicated in the judgment of the lower court (hereinafter “auction case”) to the Nonindicted Party who wished to purchase the land; (b) set the bid price and set up the bid list; and (c) the Nonindicted Party did so until the completion of the registration of ownership transfer; and (d) received the commission for the commission after the Defendants became the purchaser in the auction case; and (b) based on the above circumstances, the Defendants agreed to receive the commission from the attorney-at-law and actually acted in the process of the auction case of the instant land for the Nonindicted Party without legal knowledge or lack; and (c) based on its external form, it was practically recognized that the auction case of the instant land was done by proxy without the form of proxy, and thus, (c) the Defendants did not accept the judgment of misunderstanding the legal principles as to the money and valuables and the legal relations of the attorney-at-law by accepting the allegation of facts and thus, did not accept the judgment of the Defendants in violation of the law.

3. Of the grounds of appeal, the part disputing the fact-finding, which is the basis of the judgment of the court below, is merely an error of the judgment of the court below as to the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the court

In addition, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the evidence duly admitted, the court below's reasoning that the Defendants did not constitute a legitimate application for purchase on the sole basis of Defendant 2's violation of the method of acting as an agent for the applicant for purchase registered by the court below is inappropriate. However, since the Defendants' act of acting as an agent for all procedures necessary for the purchase of real estate through an auction from introducing the pertinent real estate to the application for the registration of ownership transfer, which is a non-contentious case, and the scope of duties exceeded the scope of duties, this constitutes an act of dealing with legal affairs prohibited under Article 109 subparagraph

Therefore, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the representation for an application for purchase of auction real estate by a broker, interpretation of Article 109 subparag. 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, or by exceeding the bounds of free evaluation of evidence

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)