대여금
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. In light of the fact that there is no dispute over the cause of the claim, as well as the overall purport of the statements and arguments set forth in Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, it can be acknowledged that the plaintiff, the representative director of the corporation, supplied goods to Eul, the defendant, the defendant, from the Hanman of August 2006 to February 28, 2007, and the balance of the goods price was 24,020,000, and the defendant issued a promissory note as of December 22, 2006 to the plaintiff on December 22, 2006, with a face value of KRW 100,000,000,000, and the due date was December 22, 2007, a notary public prepared a notarized bill as of December 206, 206.
Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the defendant paid the price for goods to D's C Co., Ltd. on behalf of the plaintiff by guaranteeing or guaranteeing the payment of the price for goods. Thus, the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff the remainder of the price for goods and delay damages, barring any special circumstance.
2. The defendant's defense and the plaintiff's defense
A. The defendant's defense is a defense that the above claim for the price of goods has expired by the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. According to the above facts, according to the above facts, the above claim for the price of goods constitutes a claim for the price of products and goods sold by the producer and merchant. On December 22, 2007, the payment date of the above promissorysory note, is the due date for the above claim for the price of goods against the defendant. Since it is apparent in the record that the plaintiff's lawsuit in this case was filed on May 26, 2015, which was three years after the lawsuit in this case, it is obvious that the above claim for the price of goods had already expired by the statute of limitations before the lawsuit in this case was filed, the defendant's defense is reasonable
B. On January 16, 2008, before the expiration of the extinctive prescription period, the Plaintiff’s re-claimed that the said extinctive prescription was interrupted by filing an application for an explanation of property against the Defendant on January 16, 2008.