강제추행등
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (limited to eight months of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution, and forty hours of order to attend a course) that the court below rendered is too unfased and unreasonable.
2. In this case’s ex officio determination, determination on whether to issue an employment restriction order to welfare facilities for disabled persons and the period of employment restriction pursuant to Article 2 of the Addenda to the Welfare of Disabled Persons Act (Act No. 15904, Dec. 11, 2018) and Article 59-3(1) of the Welfare of Disabled Persons Act should be based on the examination and determination
(4) As seen below, the lower court did not reverse the judgment on the ground that the Defendant exempted the Defendant from the employment restriction order on the welfare facilities for the disabled as well as the Defendant’s employment restriction order on the welfare facilities for the disabled. Since the lower court determined that there are special circumstances under which the Defendant may not issue the employment restriction order on the welfare facilities for the same reason as the Defendant stated in the employment restriction order on the child and juvenile-related institutions, the Defendant is exempted from the employment restriction order on the
3. The Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the public prosecutor’s trial-oriented principle and direct principle on the prosecutor’s assertion of unfair sentencing, ought to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there exists an area unique to the first instance court concerning the determination of sentencing, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance
(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Comprehensively taking account of all the various circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing specified in the records and arguments in this case, the sentencing of the lower judgment does not seem to have been too minor beyond the scope of reasonable discretion, and there is no new special circumstance or change in circumstances that may be reflected in the sentencing of the Defendant after the lower judgment was sentenced.
Therefore, the prosecutor's above assertion is without merit.
4. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is without merit.