[2] The case holding that in a case where Byung leased land for which the provisional registration of ownership transfer claim was completed under the name of Byung, his father Byung, after completing the registration of ownership transfer under the name of Eul, for the purpose of owning the building without fixing a period, Byung leased land for the purpose of owning the building, and thereafter completed the registration of ownership transfer under the name of Byung, Gap sought removal of the fixed building constructed on the land and delivery of the land, and Jung sought purchase of the fixed building, etc., the Byung may not exercise the right to purchase the ground against

Meanwhile, in the event that a third party, other than a landowner, has performed an act of leasing land, a third party is legally represented by a landowner or confirmed an act of unauthorized representation by a third party by a landowner, and thus the effect of a lease agreement is reverted to a landowner, the landowner becomes the other party to the right to purchase the ground property as a lessor. However, if a third party leased land as a party to a lease agreement, barring any special circumstance, such as the landowner’s succession to the status of a lessor, a landowner who is not a lessor cannot become

[2] The case holding that in case where Byung leased land for which provisional registration of ownership transfer claim was completed under Gap's name after the registration of ownership transfer was completed under Eul's name, Eul's father Byung's name, and Byung leased land for the purpose of owning a building without fixing a period, and thereafter completed the registration of ownership transfer under Gap's name, Gap sought removal of fixed-owned buildings, etc. constructed on the land and delivery of land, and Jung sought purchase of fixed buildings, the land owner who is not a lessor cannot be the other party to the lessee's right to claim ground property unless there are special circumstances such as succeeding the lessor's status, and thus, Eul's lease of land from Byung cannot exercise the right to claim ground property against Gap who is not a lessor in principle

1. In cases where the lease term expires in the land lease of which the object is the ownership of a building, etc. or expires due to the notification of the termination of the lease which is not determined, the lessee may request the lessor to purchase the building, etc. at a reasonable price pursuant to Article 643 of the Civil Act. The lessee’s right to demand the purchase of the ground object is to preserve the remaining value of the ground building from a national economic perspective and to protect the lessee from the exclusive exercise of ownership by the landowner, and, in principle, to exercise the lessor who has ownership at the time of the termination of the lease. In cases where the lessor transfers the ownership of the land to a third party due to the transfer of the land, etc., the lessor may exercise the said right to purchase against the new landowner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 75Da348, Apr. 26, 197; 93Da59717, Jul. 29, 194).

Meanwhile, in the event that a third party, other than a landowner, has performed an act of leasing land, a third party is legally represented by a landowner or confirmed an act of unauthorized representation by a third party by a landowner, and thus the effect of a lease agreement is reverted to a landowner, the landowner becomes the other party to the right to purchase the ground property as a lessor. However, if a third party leased land as a party to a lease agreement, barring any special circumstance, such as the landowner’s succession to the status of a lessor, a landowner who is not a lessor cannot become

2. The lower court acknowledged the following facts based on the admitted evidence.

A. On December 30, 1963, with respect to each of the instant lands, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of Nonparty 1, who is a form of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”). On January 25, 1989, Nonparty 1 completed the provisional registration of ownership transfer claim in the name of Nonparty 2, who is the father of the Plaintiff. Afterwards, Nonparty 1 completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Plaintiff on April 11, 2002.

B. The Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff, hereinafter “Defendant”) purchased or owned the instant housing and the temple built on each of the instant land, and occupies the site.

C. Around 2000, prior to the registration of ownership transfer under the Plaintiff’s name, Nonparty 2 leased land to the Defendant for the purpose of owning the building without fixing a period of KRW 200,000 per annum, and was paid from the Defendant. Nonparty 2 received compensation for land use in a similar way as to other adjoining land under the Plaintiff’s name. The Plaintiff did not object to the Defendant’s possession and use of land prior to 2009.

3. Based on these facts, the lower court determined that: (a) Nonparty 2 trusted the land to the Plaintiff as the owner of each of the instant land; (b) even if the Plaintiff was the owner of the land, Nonparty 2 decided to exercise the right to the land; and (c) held that the lease agreement between Nonparty 2 and the Defendant was effective against the Plaintiff; and (d) accepted the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiff would exercise the right to purchase the ground property on the premise that the said lease

The Plaintiff’s assertion disputing the lower court’s fact-finding that the lower court did not go beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence is bound by the court of final appeal (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). Therefore, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s assertion disputing the lower court’s fact-finding that Nonparty 2 leased each of the instant lands to the Defendant for the purpose of owning a building is a legitimate ground for final appeal. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court

However, it is difficult to accept the lower court’s determination that the Defendant is entitled to exercise the right to claim a ground object against the Plaintiff. In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, barring any special circumstance, such as the lessor’s succession to the lessor’s position, the Defendant, in principle, cannot exercise the right to claim a ground object against the Plaintiff, who is not a lessor, a landowner. Moreover, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Plaintiff and Nonparty 2 entered into a title trust agreement solely on the circumstances revealed in the record, and even if such agreement existed, the title trust agreement is null and void pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept the Defendant’s assertion that the lease agreement between Nonparty 2 and the Defendant extends to the Plaintiff, or that the Plaintiff becomes the

Nevertheless, while the other party who entered into a lease agreement with the Defendant, the lessee, is Nonparty 2, the lower court determined that the Defendant could exercise the right to purchase the ground property against the Plaintiff, not a lessor. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the right to purchase the ground property between the parties to the lease agreement and the lessee, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of

4. The judgment of the court below is reversed without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)