Attorney Park Sung-sung, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant

Attorney Doh-sung et al.

Attorney Lee Jae-sik, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Law Firm Barun International

Attorney Lee Jae-chul

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The following facts do not conflict between the parties, or can be acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the following facts: Gap evidence 1-2, Gap evidence 2-3, Gap evidence 4-1, 2, Gap evidence 5, 6, and 7; the educational foundation Ya Hospital; Zzz Foundation Hospital; ZZ Hospital; and XX Hospital as a result of each fact-finding conducted by the medical corporation Ya Hospital; and the whole purport of the arguments.

A. On August 27, 2007, the defendant entered into an insurance contract with the plaintiff as stated in the attached Form 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "the insurance contract of this case"). The insurance contract of this case is to be paid to the defendant only once for the first diagnosis when the defendant, who is the insured, was diagnosed as a acute fluoral disease, and to be treated as a hospital or clinic due to disease II, and to be paid to the plaintiff for hospitalization expenses and hospitalization expenses for disease, and to be treated as a hospital or clinic. At the time of entering into the insurance contract of this case, the defendant did not undergo a diagnosis or examination by doctors or undergo a surgery, hospitalization, operation, and medical examination for the first time during the insurance period of the insurance period of this case, 2.0 .0 . 3 . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'the 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . .. . .. . . .... . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. .)..... . .. . . . . ..... ..... . ... . . . . . ... . ..... ..... . . ..... . .... . ...... ......... ........................

C. On October 4, 2007, the Defendant received a diagnosis of 'c Cooperation (Proof)' from the Z Hospital on 4 occasions on the 16th day of the same month after receiving the ZZ Hospital by her request, and then received various heart tests (the heart map, chest X-ray photographs, physical movement load tests, heart portrait foods, general blood and urine tests), and received various heart tests (the heart-type surgery, 24 hours old-end surgery, general blood and urine tests) and administered the ZZ Hospital on 23 October 2007. In addition, the Defendant received the examination of acute fluencing, high pressure and urculatory culatory culmatosis, and then received the hospital treatment related to the ZZ Hospital by the 29th day of the same month.

2. The plaintiff and the defendant's assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendant had already received the notice of the result of the instant medical examination, stating “the blood pressure diagnosis from YY Hospital” before entering into the instant insurance contract, but entered into the instant insurance contract with the Plaintiff. Therefore, the instant insurance contract is null and void pursuant to Article 644 of the Commercial Act, as the occurrence of the insurance accident was already finalized, and even if not, the Plaintiff, who is the insurer, had already terminated the instant insurance contract around November 30, 2007 on the ground that the Defendant did not notify the Plaintiff of the above fact corresponding to the “material fact” at the time of entering into the instant insurance contract (the Plaintiff was not liable to pay the insurance money pursuant to Article 655 of the Commercial Act), and (3) the Defendant concluded the instant insurance contract on the grounds of fraud. Accordingly, the Plaintiff did not have any obligation to pay the insurance money related to the instant insurance contract to the Defendant.

B. Defendant’s assertion

The Defendant, on June 28, 2007, received the notice of the results of the instant health examination stating that “the second medical examination is required because of the suspicion of a disease, such as blood pressure, etc., from the Y Hospital.” However, since various inspection values recorded in the above notice do not considerably deviate from the Defendant’s normal range taking into account the Defendant’s age (58 years old at the time of the conclusion of the instant insurance contract), the Defendant did not undergo the second medical examination. The Defendant did not receive a diagnosis or treatment of a disease as stated in the above notice prior to the conclusion of the instant insurance contract. Thus, it cannot be deemed that prior to the conclusion of the instant insurance contract, a high blood pressure, etc., was already caused, or that the Defendant had a duty to notify the Plaintiff of the results of the instant health examination at the time of the conclusion of the instant insurance contract

3. Determination

A. Determination on the invalidity of the instant insurance contract

The plaintiff's assertion that the insurance contract of this case is null and void because the occurrence of the insurance accident is already finalized, it is insufficient to acknowledge it only with Gap evidence No. 3's statement alone, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. [Article 644 of the Commercial Act provides that an insurance contract for the insurance accident for which the occurrence of the insurance accident has already been confirmed is not allowed under the nature of the insurance contract which assumes the chance of the occurrence of the insurance accident, so in order to be subject to the above legal provision, there is a ground to view that the occurrence of the insurance accident has been objectively confirmed" before the conclusion of the insurance contract (e.g., there has already been a final diagnosis of a disease corresponding to the insurance accident before the conclusion of the insurance contract). Thus, it is difficult to view that the defendant was notified of the result of the medical examination of this case conducted by the National Health Insurance Corporation prior to the conclusion of the insurance contract of this case to the effect that the second medical examination was necessary because the defendant was suspected of the disease such as blood pressure, etc. at the time, or confirmed the disease such as

C. Determination on the assertion of breach of disclosure obligation

(1) "Important matters" under Article 651 of the Commercial Act, which are required to notify the insurer at the time of the insurance contract, means the standard matters for the insurer to determine whether to conclude the insurance contract or the content of the insurance contract, such as the addition of the premium or special exemption clause, by measuring the occurrence of the insured events and the estimated rate of liability arising therefrom, and where the insurer objectively knows the fact, it refers to the matters deemed that the insurer does not conclude the contract, regardless of whether to conclude the contract or at least the same condition, if it is objectively known that the insurer knows the fact. What amount of fact should vary depending on the type of the insurance, which must be objectively observed and determined in light of the insurance technology. However, the fact that the insurer asked in writing can be presumed to constitute important matters in the insurance contract (Article 651-2 of the Commercial Act), and if the insurer's written subscription contains the intent to answer certain matters, the insurer's intention or negligence should be presumed to be "important matters" under Article 651 of the Commercial Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da138494.

(2) In light of the following circumstances, even if the above facts and evidence were found to have been found to have been found to have been 0 or more, it is difficult for the Defendant to view the above facts to have been found to have been 1 or 2, as the result of the health examination of this case was 1 or 2, and the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case was not 0 or more than 1 or 2, and it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case was 0 or more times prior to the conclusion of the health examination of this case, and the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case was 1 or 2, and it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case was 0 or more times before the conclusion of the health examination of this case, and that the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case was 1 or 2,000 square meters above the Defendant’s notification of the results of the health examination of this case.

(3) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on the termination of the instant insurance contract, which is premised on the Defendant’s breach of duty of disclosure by intention or negligence, is without merit without further review.

D. As seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the determination of the claim on the cancellation of the instant insurance contract on the ground of fraud constitutes “important matters” under the obligation of the Defendant to notify the Plaintiff, the insurer, as the result of the instant health examination. Moreover, the entries of evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, and evidence Nos. 1, 4-1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 are insufficient to deem that the Defendant concluded the instant insurance contract with hiding the outcome of the instant health examination with the intent of deceiving the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to support this otherwise. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case based on the premise that the insurance contract of this case is null and void, or that the defendant is lawfully terminated or revoked on the grounds that it violated the defendant's duty to notify or deception, etc., is without merit to further examine the defendant's legal reasoning, and thus, it is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Jeong-young

Judges Choi Young-chul