2. In light of the fact that the sentencing is determined within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing is determined after the appellate court’s ex post facto review nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the first instance sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the first instance sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the difference from the appellate court’s opinion is different from that of the first instance judgment, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The prosecutor did not submit new data on sentencing at the lower court’s discretion before and after the first instance court’s determination of unfair sentencing as alleged by the prosecutor, including the circumstance and circumstances that the Defendant had already been subject to criminal punishment by the victim.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the appeal is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.