beta
(영문) 대구지방법원 2019.05.29 2018나9720

소유권이전등기

Text

1. Each of the plaintiffs' appeals is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following changes. As such, it is cited by the main sentence of

The fourth-party 12 to 14 of the judgment of the first instance shall be changed as follows:

As to the plaintiffs' primary argument, "A. First, we examine the plaintiffs' primary argument. The court of first instance made a statement from N who is N who is N who is N who is N who is N who is N who is N who is NN residents of the Dong stated that he purchased the land of this case, but this statement is merely a statement that he purchased the land of this case, and the above witness made a statement that he did not confirm the ownership relationship of the land of this case. In light of the fact that the above witness made a statement that he did not confirm the ownership relationship of the land of this case, it is insufficient to recognize that the deceased K purchased the land of this case from L around January 1, 1950 by the testimony of the witness of the court of first instance and the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' primary argument is without merit. Accordingly,

As seen in the foregoing, from around 1925, the deceased K had occupied the instant land by building up the instant building on the instant land from around 1925. At the time of the commencement of the aforementioned occupation, there was no assertion as to the fact that the deceased K consented by L, a landowner of the instant land at the time of the commencement of the possession, and there was no assertion as to the fact that L, a cause for acquiring the instant land exists, such as the purchase of the instant land from L, and there was no assertion as to the fact that L, a net K, had commenced possession of the instant land under the title of lease or loan for use at the time of the above time, and that the Plaintiff purchased the instant land

The possession of the network K on the land of this case constitutes the possession acquired on the basis of the title that appears to have no intention to own and thus the presumption of possession with autonomy has been broken out.

In addition, as seen earlier, it is true that the network K purchased the instant land from the network L in 1950.