beta
(영문) 수원지방법원 2020.04.22 2019나71295

손해배상(기)

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The grounds for appeal by the plaintiff citing the judgment of the court of first instance are not significantly different from the allegations in the court of first instance, and even if the evidence submitted in the court of first instance and the statement in Gap evidence 16 (including the serial number) submitted by the plaintiff at the court of first instance are presented, the fact-finding and judgment of the court of first instance

Therefore, the reasoning of this court concerning this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the following between the fourth and fifth of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, it is acceptable to accept this as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the

Additional parts (as of the first instance judgment, between the fourth and fifth).

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant, a user of F and G, who forged the monthly rent contract regarding the instant housing, is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages equivalent to the amount of the deposit for lease, as the Plaintiff suffered damages by receiving a successful bid for the instant housing with the existence of the lessee E and the amount of the deposit for lease, by gathering the lease deposit money. As such, the Plaintiff’s assertion is concerned.

The fact that F and G committed a crime against the defendant, such as fraud, by forging a monthly rent contract on the instant housing while serving as the defendant's director and the head of division, is committed as seen earlier.

However, the above F and G merely obtained a loan by deceiving the Defendant by forging the monthly rent contract as above, and it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff used a deceptive act against the Plaintiff in the process of receiving the bid for the instant house.

Rather, as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff could have sufficiently known the possibility of accepting the lease deposit of a lessee with opposing power, on April 20, 201, as well as the detailed statement of the sale of the real estate, the current status of the real estate, and the investigation report on the possession of the real estate.

Therefore, F and G's tort against the plaintiff is committed.