(a)as shown in the reasons for the attachment of the claim;

(b) Defendant C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, M, N, P, Q, Q, U, and W: Judgment by deeming confession (Articles 208(3)2 and 150(3)2 of the Civil Procedure Act) Defendant B and V by service by publication (Article 208(3)3 of the Civil Procedure Act)

2. In full view of the overall purport of the pleadings in each of the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 1-1, 2, 3, 2-2, and 3-1 through 20 against defendant T, the facts constituting the cause of the claim can be acknowledged. Thus, the above defendant is liable to make the plaintiff an expression of consent as stated in the order.

As to this, Defendant T first, from around 1973, the registration of ownership transfer was completed with respect to the share of the instant land from around 1973, and thus, the acquisition by prescription with respect to the register under Article 245(2) of the Civil Act was established. Thus, in this case, the registration of ownership transfer was completed with respect to the share of the order for which the Plaintiff seeks consent. Therefore, the Defendant’s assertion that the acquisition by prescription with respect to the above share has been completed is without merit.

In addition, Defendant T asserts that the principle of invalidation should be applied by the Plaintiff’s failure to exercise his right for a long period of time. As such, “the principle of invalidation and invalidation” refers to cases where the other party, who is the obligor, did not exercise his right over a long period of time, has a legitimate expectation to believe that the other party, as the obligor, would no longer exercise his right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da31624, Feb. 10, 1995). In light of the above legal principles, the exercise of the right by the right holder is prohibited as violating the principle of trust and good faith which controls the entire legal order (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da