[2] Whether there is a road noise exceeding the environmental noise standard under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy concerning noise in roadside areas, and thus, it can be determined that there exists an unlawful infringement exceeding the civil “limit of reference” (negative)

[3] In a case where a propriety of a claim seeking prevention or elimination of noise due to road noise is determined, whether the benefits to be received by the party who seeks permission of the claim and the disadvantages to be suffered by the other party and the third party should be compared and compared (affirmative)

1. A. Whether the degree of noise generated from roads exceeds generally accepted social norms (hereinafter referred to as “living obstruction limit”) and should be determined by comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances such as nature and degree of damage, public nature of benefits from damage, harmful behavior, public nature of harmful act, prevention measures against the perpetrator or possibility of avoiding damage, violation of regulation standards in public law, regionality, and priority of land use, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da47528, Jul. 27, 1999; 2004Da37904, 37911, Jun. 15, 2007). In addition, the issue of whether the road is an indispensable facility in modern life and serves as an exclusive infrastructure for traffic and balanced development between regions, convenience in industrial and economic activities of the State, etc., and road traffic noise measures are being implemented in accordance with the overall construction of major road networks around urban and industrial development projects, and the issue of whether it is an increase in public road noise and its own residential noise.

Meanwhile, environmental standards under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy as public law are desirable standards to be maintained in order to protect the health of the people and to create a pleasant environment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Da49868, Nov. 25, 2010). Such environmental standards are merely set within the applicable area without considering the kinds and grades of roads as provided in the Road Act or the Road Traffic Act, the number of lanes, and the rear relationship between roads and dwelling, so it is difficult to conclude that the road traffic noise from the second and upper floors complies with the environmental standards under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy as standards. Considering that the noise level on the second and upper floors complies with the environmental standards under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy (Ministry of Environment Notice No. 2008-22) or the “The “The Fair Noise and Vibration Examination Standards” (Ministry of Environment Notice No. 2010-142, Nov. 25, 2010) to the extent of noise noise from the window, door, or building noise level exceeding 0.

Therefore, it is reasonable to determine whether a person living in a multi-family housing is being disturbed by the noise level measured in a state of opening all windows of the direction of the noise source, such as roads, at the living room where daily life is the place where the daily life is actually conducted, depending on whether the noise level exceeds the environmental noise standard under the Framework Act on Environmental Policy.

B. Furthermore, a claim seeking the prevention or exclusion of noise due to road noise differs from the claim for damages, which differs from the content and requirements of the claim for monetary compensation. Thus, even under the same circumstance, there may be differences in the importance of factors to be considered according to the contents of the claim. If the claim is accepted, it may have a significant impact on the interests of the parties to the lawsuit as well as third parties. As such, the court that determines the legitimacy of the claim should compare and supplement the benefits to be received by the party seeking the claim and the disadvantages to be received by the other party and the third party when the claim is accepted.

2. The lower court determined that the lower court determined that: (a) the level of outdoor noise from the households living on the expressway, etc. under Article 12(2) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, based on the fact that the noise level at night (06:0-22:00) 65cc per week (dB), night (22:0 to 06:0) and 55cc (dB), and (b) the Minister of Gwangju City Health and Environment, which measured the noise level at the time of 101 apartment units on 7 or more stories of the household living on 101, 72cc (dB), the degree of outdoor noise from the households living on the expressway, etc. on 68cc or less, and that the noise level at night from the households living on the expressway, which had not arrived at the time of this case’s installation of noise level at least 65cc (dB), and that the Plaintiff’s installation of the noise level at night (hereinafter “Defendant’s residential area”) and the designated parties”).

3. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, ① the Highway was opened around November 1, 1973, and it was extended from Seogju to Seogju around September 1986, and around August 13, 1989, the apartment project plan of this case was approved on or around April 2003, and around around October 2005, the Defendant started to move into the apartment. ② Most residents living in the city due to urbanization, industrialization, and over-concentration of residence, etc. were residing in a specific place. In principle, it is difficult to find that the residents were able to enjoy their daily lives with pleasant and pleasant conditions, and it is difficult to view that the noise level of the apartment as well as the daily life of the residents of this case was formed based on the noise level of the apartment, which was measured by the residents of this case, as well as on the daily life of the residents of this case, based on the noise level of the apartment at the site of this case.

Examining such circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendant, etc. was interfered with life immediately exceeding the “limit of attendance” solely on the ground of the circumstance, such as the time of original judgment.

B. Meanwhile, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the Defendant et al. asserted that the Defendant et al. was liable to take measures to prevent noise damage even though they were obligated to take measures to prevent noise damage, and that the Defendant et al. suffered mental suffering. Therefore, the Plaintiff was liable to compensate the Defendant et al. for damage and to implement soundproof measures pursuant to Article 758 of the

However, with respect to noise damage caused by defects in the installation and preservation of structures, a claim for damages can only be filed under Article 758 of the Civil Act, and cannot be filed for the prevention of infringement. In order to seek the exclusion of infringement, the Defendant, etc. must clearly state the source of the claim. If the Defendant, etc. claims the prevention as an exercise of a real right right based on ownership or possessory right, the court should have asserted the propriety of the claim for prevention and the specific details of the obligation to implement soundproof measures for the purpose of exercising the Plaintiff’s defense right. The lower court should have determined the legitimacy of the claim for prevention specifically asserted what measures or construction is necessary in order to prevent traffic noise exceeding a certain level by exercising the right of explanation. On this premise, the lower court should have compared the benefits to be received by the Defendant, etc. due to the implementation of soundproof measures and the disadvantages to be suffered by the Plaintiff and the instant expressway users.

C. The lower court should have determined whether the Plaintiff was obligated to perform the obligation to compensate for damages and soundproofing measures against the Defendant, etc., taking full account of the aforementioned various circumstances. However, the Defendant, etc.’s daily life did not measure the noise level at the location where it actually takes place, and did not properly take into account the characteristics of the instant expressway and the follow-up relationship of land use, and did not require the Defendant, etc. to assert specific details of the obligation to take soundproofing measures to be borne by the Plaintiff. Based on the acceptance of the instant claim for prevention, the lower court acknowledged the Plaintiff’s obligation to compensate for damages and to take soundproofing measures without comparing and comparing the benefits and disadvantages that the litigant and road users would suffer. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the “limit of access” and the claim for prevention due to interference with the daily life due to road noise, which led to failure to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff regarding the main lawsuit and counterclaim is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Appointeds: Omitted

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)