2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015 (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court appears to have determined punishment in full view of the unforeseen circumstances, and no new

In addition, comprehensively taking account of all other circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing as shown in records and pleadings, the lower court’s punishment cannot be deemed unreasonable because it goes beyond the scope of reasonable discretion.

3. The prosecutor's appeal of conclusion is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Provided, pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Regulations on Criminal Procedure, the term “exemption from the employment restriction order of 1.1.” is rewritten as “1. Public disclosure order, notification order, and exemption from employment restriction order,” and the contents thereof are corrected as follows.” Articles 47(1) and 49(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes, the proviso to Article 49(1) and Article 50(1) of the former Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Amended by Act No. 16622, Nov. 26, 2019); Article 2 of the Addenda to the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Act No. 1622, Nov. 26, 2019); the proviso to Article 56(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse; and the proviso to Article 59-3(1) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities [the Defendant’s age, family environment; the background of the instant crime; the type and details of the instant order;