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(영문) 대법원 1965. 12. 21. 선고 65다1910 판결

[건물철거][집13(2)민,296]

Main Issues

Cases of recognizing abuse of rights

Summary of Judgment

Since the Plaintiff purchased 162 square meters in the part of the site in question (5 square meters), the Plaintiff filed a claim against the Plaintiff to remove a fair building on the said part of the site in question in order to remove the building on the said part of the site in question at the Plaintiff’s request to prevent noise and to remove the building on the neighboring site, and to remove the building on the site in question at the Plaintiff’s request, and to remove the building on the site in question and to remove the building on the site in question in order to remove the building on the site in question and to remove the building on the site in question in order to remove the building on the site in question and to remove the building on the site in question at the Plaintiff’s request, the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit. The Plaintiff’s claim constitutes an abuse of rights if the Plaintiff’s demand was to remove the building on the site in question and the building on the site in question, and the building on the site in question is equivalent to KRW 12,500.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 2(2) of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff

Defendant-Appellee

Waterproof leather

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu District Court Decision 64Na393 delivered on July 27, 1965

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

Reasons

According to the facts established by lawful evidence of the court below, the plaintiff owned 62 square meters on the building site in Daegu-si and 50,000 won, and the defendant had constructed a direct manufacturing factory on the same building site (number omitted) adjacent thereto. At the time when the plaintiff purchased 62 square meters of the above building site (20,000 won attached to the judgment, 50,000 won was installed on the building site, and the machinery facilities of the defendant's management were installed on the building site in this case for several years without any objection as to the boundary issues, so the plaintiff's request to devise measures to prevent factory noise and vibration. On the other hand, the plaintiff's request to remove 50,000 won or more from the building site in this case, and the plaintiff's building site in this case was owned by 50,000 won or more by 43,000 won or more, and the plaintiff's construction site in this case was owned by 45,500,000 won or more from the building site site.

However, the plaintiff's ground of appeal No. 1 is that the plaintiff's agreement was reached with the original defendant in the construction of the mentor brick gate, which was established on the boundary of the original defendant's land occupied by the original defendant, and there was no evidence to believe that the court below found such agreement, but there was no evidence to believe that it was sufficient to recognize such agreement, and that the judgment was erroneous, but the court below found that the original defendant did not raise any objection to the registration of the mentor mentor's president's establishment of the original court, and it did not purport to recognize the fact that the plaintiff agreed on the boundary of the land as the original party, and even if the statement of the size of the president is somewhat different in light of evidence, it cannot

The gist of the grounds of appeal No. 2 is that it was erroneous for the court below to recognize the removal cost as 2.30,000 won, and that the defendant's assertion of the above costs was not clearly stated that it was unlawful, or that the court need not, in regard to the racing track which changed the facts alleged by the party in the first instance from the second instance, and there is no error of law in recognizing the removal cost as recognized by the court below. Thus, the argument is groundless.

The ground of appeal No. 3 is that the court below recognized the fact that the site of this case is necessary for the factory management of the defendant. However, the court below acknowledged the above circumstances in accordance with the whole purport of the party's pleading, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of law.

The gist of the ground of appeal No. 4 is that the judgment of the court below is based on the judgment of the court below, and on the other hand, it states that the removal of the above facilities is not possible to prevent noise and vibration. However, even if the removal of the facilities, the court below decided that the removal of the facilities has no big effect on noise and vibration prevention. Thus, the appeal is groundless.

The gist of the grounds of appeal No. 5 is that the court below did not err by denying the defendant's defense of abuse of rights even though the defendant was aware of the fact that the non-party witness testimony at the court of first instance (1964.7.5) and the non-party witness testimony at the court of first instance had violated one part of the site in this case at the time of the construction of the court of first instance. However, even though the court below did not err by denying the defendant's defense of abuse of rights. However, although the contents of the brief submitted by the defendant in this case only asserted that the plaintiff purchased the site in this case and purchased the remaining site in this case, the land in this case was originally the plaintiff's purchase of the land in this case, and that it was said that the land in this case would not know of the fact that the plaintiff's land was installed in the court of first instance, it cannot be deemed that the defendant stated that the non-party's testimony at the court of second instance was not adopted, the part of the non-party's testimony at the court of appeal is without merit.

The court below affirmed that the plaintiff's claim for this case was justified in rejecting the plaintiff's claim for the main claim to the purport that it constitutes abuse of rights as an act deviating from the scope of the exercise of ownership as it was for the plaintiff's sole purpose to put the defendant into a biff and to acquire unjust profits by iceing on the exercise of ownership on the site of this case.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Han Sung-dong (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court

심급 사건
-대구지방법원 1965.7.27.선고 64나393