소유권보존등기말소등기
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. Basic facts
A. In Ischeon-si, the owner of a forest survey document prepared during the Japanese occupation occupation period with respect to C Forest land of 1,500 square meters (hereinafter “instant assessment land”) is indicated as “the State” and the relative is written as D.
B. D A deceased on November 24, 1948, and D died on December 20, 1950 and the Plaintiff, the South-North of which was the sole heir, succeeded to E’s property solely.
C. On December 1, 1967, the assessment land of this case was subject to registration conversion with B, B, 737 square meters (hereinafter “instant land”). D.
The defendant completed the registration of ownership preservation on February 9, 1996 on the land of this case.
[Ground for recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4 (including branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply)
2. The Plaintiff’s assertion is that the Plaintiff’s land was inherited to the Plaintiff after being assessed under the Plaintiff’s name, and that is owned by the Plaintiff. The Defendant completed the registration of ownership preservation even if the Plaintiff is not a lawful owner of the instant land. Therefore, the registration of invalidity of the cause thereof
Therefore, the defendant is obligated to implement the procedure for cancellation registration of registration of preservation of ownership completed in the name of the defendant.
3. Determination
A. According to Gap evidence No. 1, the owner of a forest survey document on the land of this case is "State", while the relative is written D, the relative is not written in the remarks column of this case. Thus, as long as D has no specific relation to the land of this case, the land of this case was reverted to the state since it did not have a cadastral guidance under the provisions of Article 19 of the former Clim Act (Act No. 1 of January 21, 1908) and D, which was recorded as the relative, was identified as the owner of the land of this case as the former owner. Thus, it is difficult to view that D, as the former owner's status, was identified as the owner of the land of this case.
(See Supreme Court Decision 96Da38896 delivered on October 10, 1997, etc.). B.
For this reason,