Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.

(Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the instant act of the Defendant constitutes “when the Defendant escaped without taking measures, such as aiding and abetting the victim,” and rejected the allegation in the grounds of appeal regarding mistake of facts.

The ground of appeal disputing such fact-finding by the lower court is merely an error of the lower court’s determination on the evidence selection and probative value, which belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.

In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, the relevant legal doctrine as indicated in the lower judgment, and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the criminal intent of escape in the crime of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc.

In addition, the argument that the judgment of the court below erred by exceeding the limit of sentencing discretion constitutes the argument of unfair sentencing.

However, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for more than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the defendant, the above assertion and the argument disputing the determination of the sentence by the court

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.