공무상요양불승인처분취소
1. The Defendant’s disposition of non-approval of medical care for official duties rendered on November 7, 2016 is revoked.
2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.
1. Details of the disposition;
A. On January 12, 2006, the Plaintiff was appointed as a fire-fighting officer and served as a B fire-fighting officer, first responder, and a fire-fighting vehicle driver. On March 5, 2009, the two copies that began from 18:00 to 18:40 of the day following the day when the symptoms of the 4:40 days following the death of the c fire-fighting unit D 119 Safety Center, and were transferred to the E-lane of the first-aid vehicle after the diagnosis of the cerebryang (Seoul brain room) (hereinafter “the instant injury disease”).
B. On September 30, 2016, the Plaintiff was appointed as an emergency medical service worker, and the injury or disease of this case was caused due to overwork and stress, and applied for approval of medical care for official duties to the Defendant on September 30, 2016.
C. On November 7, 2016, the Defendant rendered a decision on non-approval on the ground that there was no special cause to cause the disease in the Plaintiff’s duty, on the grounds that the cause of the disease in this case was not clear, and that there was no medical evidence that the disease in this case occurred in the Plaintiff’s working environment or working environment, and that there was no special cause to cause the disease in the Plaintiff’s duty, and thus, there was no substantial causal relationship with the official duty (hereinafter “instant disposition”).
[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 7 and 8, the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The plaintiff's assertion asserts that there is a proximate causal relation between official duties and the injury and disease of this case, since the plaintiff was on a usual night duty and overtime duty, and caused serious depression and stress due to overwork, and that the injury and disease of this case have been caused.
(b) The details of the relevant statutes are as shown in the attached statutes.
C. Fact 1) The Plaintiff’s living environment and reputation health status (A) was F and was the young age of 25 years at the time when he was appointed as a fire-fighting official on January 12, 2006, and was based on the health insurance content. < Amended by Act No. 8077, Dec. 2, 2008>