Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.

(Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the court below rejected the grounds for appeal as to the mistake of facts against the defendant, on the ground that the first instance court that found the victim's statement credibility and found the defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case was justifiable.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal disputing such fact-finding by the lower court is nothing more than disputing the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which actually belongs to the free judgment of the lower court.

In addition, even if the reasoning of the lower judgment is examined in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

Meanwhile, the argument that the first instance court's decision to exclude a participatory trial on the ground of the victim's intention violates equity is not a legitimate ground for appeal, as it newly asserts in the final appeal that the Defendant's decision to exclude a participatory trial is the ground for appeal or the lower court's decision is not subject to

In addition, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the defendant, the argument that the amount of punishment is unreasonable

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.