자동차운전면허취소처분취소
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. Details of the instant disposition
A. On June 26, 1999, the Plaintiff was a person who obtained a Class II driver’s license (B) from the Seoul Regional Police Agency, and was under the influence of alcohol level 0.115% under the influence of alcohol level 0.115% around November 28, 2015, the Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol level 0.40%.
B. On December 30, 2015, the Defendant rendered a disposition to revoke the Plaintiff’s driver’s license in relation to the Plaintiff’s drinking operation as stated in the preceding paragraph (hereinafter the instant disposition was conducted).
C. The Plaintiff, who is dissatisfied with the instant disposition, filed an application with the Central Administrative Appeals Commission for a ruling seeking revocation of the instant disposition, but was issued a ruling dismissing the Plaintiff’s application on February 23, 2016.
[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 11, Eul evidence No. 1 to 3, the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Determination on the legitimacy of the disposition
A. (1) Although the Plaintiff’s assertion (1) procedural defect completed re-measurement on November 18, 2015, and demanded re-measurement, the Plaintiff did not comply with the re-measurement request with the Plaintiff’s request, and the instant disposition was unlawful when the Plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity for re-measurement.
(2) On November 18, 2015, the non-existence of the grounds for disposition, the Plaintiff driven a vehicle at a restaurant located in Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government, Yeongdeungpo-gu, to the Gangnam-gu, Seoul E apartment by not later than 21:40 after drinking his employees and glass. The drinking measurement was conducted at least 22:09 when 30 minutes elapsed from that time. Since 90 minutes have not elapsed from the final drinking point to the driving point, the possibility that the blood alcohol concentration at the time falls under the increase in the blood alcohol concentration cannot be ruled out.
Nevertheless, under the premise that the plaintiff's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving is downstanding, the defendant applied the Dadmark formula to the blood alcohol concentration measured in 22:09, and judged that the plaintiff was driven under the influence of alcohol on November 18, 2015.