2. In our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there are unique areas of the court of first instance regarding the determination of sentencing, and in light of the ex post facto and aesthetic nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the court of first instance, and the sentencing of the court of first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. It is desirable to reverse the judgment of the court of first instance solely on the ground that the sentencing of the court of first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, but is somewhat different from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In accordance with the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court on the grounds that new sentencing materials have not been submitted in the examination and trial.

In addition, even in full view of all the sentencing factors shown in the records and arguments of this case, the sentencing of the court below is not recognized to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion because the sentencing of the court below is too large.

Therefore, this part of the defendant's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that it is without merit.

(However, according to Article 25 (1) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the judgment of the court below ex officio and the application of the law shall be corrected as "Article 53 and Article 55 (1) 3 of the Criminal Act" to "Article 53 and Article 55 (1) 6 of the Criminal Act."