난민불인정결정취소
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
1. During the process of the disposition, the Plaintiff’s non-professional employment (E-9) for refugee status non-professional employment (E-9) (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on December 6, 201, the date of the application for refugee status recognition on October 5, 2016, and the date of the decision of December 21, 2017: The fact that there is no ground for rejection of the decision of the decision of the Supreme Court on February 14, 2018, as of January 4, 2018, and that there is no ground for rejection of the decision of the decision of the Supreme Court on February 14, 2019, as of the date of the application for objection, and the purport of the entire pleadings as a whole.
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. If the Plaintiff’s asserted family members did not receive donations from four arms’ illegal armed forces B, the Plaintiff must return to four arms and act as a member of the Plaintiff’s organization.
In the event that the Plaintiff returned to the Republic of Korea, the instant disposition that did not recognize the Plaintiff as a refugee even though it could be threatened by the said organization is unlawful.
B. (1) In full view of the provisions of Article 2 subparag. 1 and Article 18 of the Refugee Act, Article 1 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, and Article 1 of the Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the Minister of Justice must recognize a foreigner in the Republic of Korea who is unable or does not want the protection of the country of his nationality due to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, as a refugee.
“persecution” which is a requirement for refugee status refers to “any act causing serious infringement of, or discrimination against, essential human dignity, including threats to life, body, or freedom.” A foreigner who files an application for refugee status must prove that there is a “a sufficient-founded fear of fear.”
Shebly, in light of the following circumstances that can be seen by comprehensively taking into account the entries in No. 3 and the overall purport of the pleadings: