2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion of the appellate court, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015, etc.). Since new materials on sentencing have not been submitted in the health unit and the appellate court, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court, and even considering the reasons for the sentencing stated by the lower court, it is not recognized that the sentencing of the Defendants exceeded the reasonable scope of the discretion because it is too unfford.

Therefore, the prosecutor's above assertion cannot be accepted.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal against the defendants is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.