1. Of the facts charged in the instant case, the summary of the violation of the Act on the Election of Public Officials due to Preliminary Election is that the Defendant distributed approximately 300 marbs indicating the Defendant’s appeal for the election of the National Assembly members prior to the election campaign period (hereinafter “the instant name cards”) to the front of the vehicle parked in the apartment parking lot, and distributed it to the Defendant for election campaign.

The lower court acknowledged that the Defendant distributed the instant name of the Defendant on April 19, 2015, and upheld the first instance judgment that convicted the Defendant by applying Article 254(2) of the Public Official Election Act.

2. However, the judgment of the court below cannot be accepted for the following reasons.

A. For punishment pursuant to Article 254(2) of the Public Official Election Act, the purpose of “election campaign” should be “election campaign” or the pertinent act should be recognized as “election campaign” in itself.

B. The meaning of an election campaign under the Public Official Election Act and the scope of an election campaign prohibited ought to be determined in accordance with the following specific standards (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do11812, Aug. 26, 2016). 1) The term “election campaign” refers to an act objectively recognized for the purpose of promoting the election or defeat of a specific candidate in a specific election. The relevant act ought to be objectively determined not by the internal intent of the person who performs the relevant act but by the external expression of the act.

2) The foregoing intent may be recognized not only by explicit methods such as requesting support by disclosing an intention to leave a specific election, but also by cases where the intent of seeking election or defeat in a specific election is easily inferred from an elector’s perspective in light of the objective circumstances at the time.

The above purpose was intended.