Representative Director A

Attorney Cha Jong-il, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. On February 17, 2009, the Plaintiff granted a loan of KRW 5,125,000 at the interest rate of KRW 31.99% per annum to the Defendant’s husband, who is the Defendant’s husband, at the rate of 43.9% per annum.

B. According to the Plaintiff’s loan transaction agreement approved by Park Jong-C, in the event that the obligor fails to repay the loan in accordance with the agreed interest repayment method or when the credit condition becomes worse as the obligor entered in credit bad faith, etc., the Defendant agreed to lose the benefit of time and immediately repay the principal and interest, and Park Jong-C lost the benefit of time by failing to pay the principal and interest in accordance with the repayment method.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, entry of Gap evidence 1-1-2, Gap evidence 2, and 3-2, the purport of the whole pleadings

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff asserts that the act of making a donation to the defendant of this case, which is the only property of Park Jong-C where he was liable to the plaintiff as above, constitutes a fraudulent act detrimental to the general creditor including the plaintiff, and the defendant, as a beneficiary of a fraudulent act, must cancel the registration of transfer of ownership with respect to the real estate of this case.

B. Determination

(1) Facts of recognition

In full view of the statements 11, 12, and 13 evidence and the fact-finding results to the chief director of community credit cooperatives, the following facts may be recognized.

(A) On February 27, 2006, Park Jong-C purchased the instant real estate from the Housing Co., Ltd. at KRW 1.7 million. The down payment of KRW 12 million and the remainder of KRW 12 million and KRW 20 million, acquisition tax, registration tax, and certified judicial scrivener’s expenses were borne by the Defendant, and the intermediate payment of KRW 75 million was loaned from the Bank as collateral and paid the instant real estate.

(B) On December 21, 2006, the Defendant transferred money of KRW 75 million to Park Jong-C while operating the American funeral, thereby having the bank repay its obligations to the bank, and cancelled the right to collateral security of the bank established on the instant real estate.

(C) On January 13, 2009, Park Jong-C, who borrowed money from Defendant M&C, set up a right to collateral security on the instant real estate, and the remaining debt therefrom is KRW 68,90,000.

(D) The Defendant, while divorced with Park C, donated the instant real estate to Park C under the pretext of consolation money, division of property, child support and education expenses for two children, etc. In the case of the instant real estate, the Defendant acquired the secured debt of the said (C) collateral security right established on the instant real estate from Park C with the approval of the creditor community credit cooperatives.

(2) Determination on the reasonableness of division of property

Inasmuch as division of property following divorce is a system that has the nature of support for the other party to the liquidation of common property formed through mutual cooperation during marriage, it is a result of reducing joint security against general creditors by transferring a certain property to the other party while divorced and transferring a certain property to the other party to the other party. Barring special circumstances to recognize that division of property exceeds a considerable degree pursuant to the purport of Article 839-2(2) of the Civil Act, it shall not be revoked as a fraudulent act, but it shall not be deemed a legitimate division of property for the portion exceeding a considerable degree. However, even in this case, the scope of revocation shall be limited to the portion exceeding a considerable degree. If there are special circumstances to deem it as a division of property beyond a considerable degree, it shall be limited to the portion exceeding a reasonable degree, and in view of the aforementioned special circumstances, the defendant cannot be deemed as having purchased the real property under the name of the other party to the above 3-year high school and the remaining property at the time of the purchase of the real property under the name of the 3-year high school and the remaining property property at the time of this case.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.