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(영문) 울산지방법원 2015.05.08 2015노53

도로교통법위반(음주측정거부)등

Text

The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (the imprisonment of 10 months, the suspension of execution of 2 years, the probation, and the community service order of 200 hours) declared by the court below is too unfasible and unreasonable.

2. On the other hand, the crime of this case was committed by the defendant without a license, resulting in refusing a request for a alcohol measurement by the police called out after receiving a report after leaving the vehicle in the atmosphere of the signal while driving the vehicle without a license. It is very poor to the nature of the crime.

In particular, considering the fact that the Defendant had already been punished for drunk driving three times (two times a fine, one time a suspended sentence), and that the Defendant was sentenced to a suspended sentence of six months for drinking and driving without a license at the Ulsan District Court on December 5, 2013, and one year has not yet passed after the judgment became final and conclusive, and that the Defendant committed the instant crime while driving in a state without a license and driving again, the Defendant should be sentenced to a strict punishment.

However, in full view of the following facts: (a) the Defendant recognized all of the instant crimes, and is in a profound radius; (b) the Defendant would not repeat the instant crime by selling a vehicle driving at the time of the instant crime; (c) there is no criminal history other than the history of punishment for drunk driving; and (d) appears to have been faithfully engaged in workplace life and supporting the family; and (c) the Defendant’s detention would have been difficult to maintain the family’s livelihood; and (d) other favorable circumstances for the Defendant, such as the Defendant’s age, family relation, criminal record, character and conduct, environment, means and method of the instant crime, motive and circumstance of the crime; and (e) all of the sentencing conditions as indicated in the instant argument and the suspended execution period, if the suspended execution period is already excessive (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do6196, Feb. 8, 2007).