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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2019.05.16 2018노3439

성매매알선등행위의처벌에관한법률위반(성매매알선등)등

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All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant A1) The Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic, Etc. (hereinafter “the Act on the Punishment of Sexual Traffic”) concerning the part concerning the crime of violating the Employment Security Act

Article 19(1)2 and 3 provides that “a person who has recruited persons to engage in the conduct of selling sex” and “a person who has introduced or arranged jobs to have them engage in the conduct of selling sex” shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding 30 million won. Article 19(1)2 and 3 provides that “a person who has received compensation for an act under any subparagraph of paragraph (1)” shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not more than seven years or by a fine not exceeding 70 million won.

Meanwhile, Article 46(1)2 of the Employment Security Act provides that “a person who conducts job placement, recruits workers, or supplies workers for the purpose of having them find a job in a job involving sexual traffic,” shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than seven years, or by a fine not exceeding 70 million won.

If a person is recruited or arranged to engage in sexual traffic in return for payment, there is no difference in the statutory penalty even if the provisions of Article 19(2) of the Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts and Article 46(1) of the Employment Security Act are applied.

However, in the event of such an act without compensation, there is a big difference in statutory penalty depending on the application of Article 19(1) of the Act on the Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts and Article 46(1) of the Employment Security Act.

Thus, in order to prevent unreasonable legal penalty varies depending on the choice of the applicable legal provision, it is reasonable to interpret Article 46(1)2 of the Employment Security Act only as “a case where the above act is committed for profit for another person’s business or where the above act is performed as a business with human resources such as job placement office and other facilities.”

In this case, the defendant A merely recruited women to engage in sexual traffic for his own business, but did not receive the price for soliciting women to engage in sexual traffic for others.