A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for two years.

A. The lower court found all of the charges of this case guilty of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.), the crime of injury, and the crime of intimidation, and sentenced the Defendant to two years by applying Articles 3(1) and 2(1)3 of the former Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (amended by Act No. 13718, Jan. 6, 2016; hereinafter “former Act”), Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act (hereinafter “instant provision”).

Accordingly, the Defendant appealed against the lower judgment on the ground that the Defendant did not have committed a crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.) due to misunderstanding of facts, and that the Defendant was not at the time of the victim’s head due to an illness, and that the Defendant’s conviction was unfair in sentencing. The Defendant did not have any ground to believe that the Defendant was erroneous before sending back. However, the lower judgment was reversed ex officio on the ground that the lower judgment was illegal by sentencing two-year imprisonment exceeding the lower limit of the applicable sentences under the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc. (a group, deadly weapon, etc.) without reducing the amount of amount, and sentenced the Defendant to a two-year imprisonment by applying the

The Defendant filed an appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance prior to the remanding. The Supreme Court did not have any justifiable ground for appeal (misunderstanding of facts) by the Defendant on the part of the crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.). However, upon the amendment of the former Act by Act No. 13718 on January 6, 2016, the provision of this case was deleted. Article 258-2 (Special Bodi Injury) newly established under the Criminal Act amended by Act No. 13719 on the same day prescribed the requirements of the provision of this case, and set a statutory penalty lower than that of the former penal provision. As such, it should be deemed that the previous penal provision was an anti-sexual measure taken from the fact that the previous penal provision was excessive, and thus, Article 258-2 (Special Injury) of the Criminal Act, a new corporation, the punishment of which instead of the provision of this case, was minor pursuant to Article 1(2