아동ㆍ청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(음란물제작ㆍ배포등)등
All appeals by the defendant and the prosecutor are dismissed.
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Defendant 1) The sentencing of the lower court is too unreasonable.
2) It is unreasonable for the lower court to order the Defendant to complete the sexual assault treatment program for 80 hours.
3) The lower court’s improper order of employment restriction is unreasonable to order the Defendant to be placed on employment for five years at child-related institutions, etc. and welfare facilities for disabled persons.
B. Prosecutor 1) The sentence of the lower court’s improper sentencing is too uncomfortable.
2) The lower court’s failure to issue an order to disclose personal information to the Defendant is unreasonable.
3) The lower court ordering the Defendant to complete the sexual assault treatment program for 80 hours is so short that the time is too short that the lower court orders the Defendant to complete the sexual assault treatment program.
4) The lower court’s improper order of employment restriction is too short to order the Defendant’s employment restriction to the juvenile-related institutions, etc. and the welfare facilities for the disabled for each five years.
2. Determination as to the unjust assertion of sentencing by Defendant and Prosecutor
A. Improper sentencing of the relevant legal doctrine refers to cases where the sentence of the lower judgment is too heavy or too minor in light of the content of the specific case.
Based on the statutory penalty, the sentencing is determined within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the conditions of the sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law that takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.
In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, if there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance court’s sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the first instance court’s sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court.